



SUPER POWERS AND THE INDIA–PAKISTAN WAR-1971

DISSERTATION

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
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
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PREFACE

The present work is an attempt to study the role of the Super powers in the India-Pakistan war of 1971 which was a fall out of the contradictions and constraints inherent in the politics of the United Pakistan and ultimately led to its break-up and the birth of independent sovereign state of Bangladesh.

India with the assistance of the Soviet Union supported the liberation struggle of Bangladesh, while the United States and China took side with Pakistan in its design to crush the liberation struggle.

The dissertation consists of four chapters. The first chapter provides a backdrop to certain factors responsible for the bitter relations between India and Pakistan from 1947-1971. The Indian involvement in the Bangladesh crisis has been analysed in the second chapter. While the third and last chapters surveys the United State's and the Soviet Union's role in the entire crisis.

The conclusion sums up the account of the previous chapters and makes suggestions aimed at maintaining peace in the sub-continent.

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Words are beyond my reach to express my sincere and special thanks and gratitude to Miss Pia Obwaka for her unequalled assistance to me during this study.

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And finally, I must also thank Mr. Suhail Ahmad, who turned a wilderness into a typescript, and the binder, who have turned a typescript into an attractive dissertation.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Nnamdi Okolie Clement', written in a cursive style.

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CHAPTER-I

INDO-PAK RELATIONS 1947-1971 - A HISTORIAL PERSPECTIVE

India and Pakistan emerged on the world map as Sovereign independent countries in August 1947, but ever since the partition of India, the relations between the two countries have been unfriendly. From the very beginning, both the countries felt threatened by each other and have been collecting arms to strengthen their armed forces. Numerous reasons are responsible for this unfriendly relations.

MINORITY QUESTION

The partition of the Indian sub-continent on the basis of the two nation theory propounded by Rahmat Ali, Iqbal and Jinnah, created a problem of migration of people on a very large scale. A large number of Hindus residing in Pakistan could not migrate from there and so also a large number of Muslims residing in India could not migrate, and had to settle and stay permanently in Pakistan and India respectively. This created the problem of Minority for both the countries. Since partition, on several occasions, serious communal riots have taken place in India and Pakistan, and thus created tension between the two countries.¹

1. Jha, D.C., Indo-Pakistan Relations (Patna, 1972), pp.230-70.

BORDER ISSUE

On several occasions there have been serious clashes between the armies of both the countries because of border disputes. The most important of these clashes was the Rann of Kutch dispute. After the creation of Bangladesh, the controversy over the Berubari enclaves of Dahagram, Lathi Tilla, Dunabari group of five villages and the dispute over the feni river area on the border between Tripura and Bangladesh have been settled.²

UTILIZATION OF WESTERN AND EASTERN RIVERS

Agreement was reached between India and Pakistan in May 1948, stipulating that in due course, the latter was to tap an alternative source for the water of the eastern rivers.³ But it failed to implement this agreement thereby aggravating the situation. After six years of hard work, the World Bank succeeded in convincing the two countries to accept a draft treaty. It was formally signed in September 1960 at Rawalpendi by the then Prime Minister of India and the Pakistani President. But the dispute over the Karnafuli Dam Project, the Farakka Barrage and the Indo-Pakistan Projects over the Testa could not be settled.

2. Bindra, S.S., Indo-Pak Relations (New Delhi, 1981), p.19.

3. Jha, D.C., n.1, p.4.

The Farakka Barrage dispute is the most important and all attempts made to solve it has proved fruitless even after the emergence of Bangladesh.⁴

The issue again came up after the follow up of the Tashkent Declaration was undertaken by both countries. On the proposed agenda which Pakistan presented for the Ministerial-level talks in February 1966, had the Farrakka Barrage inserted, and this was rejected by India. The Indian action was described by the foreign Minister of Pakistan as "contrary to international law and practise". He pointed out that the water of the river Ganga be shared equally by both sides on the basis of genuine needs and in conformity with international law.⁵

Continued attempts were made to solve the problem and in the second week of May 1968 in New Delhi, the visiting delegation expressed their fears about the diversion of the Ganga water into the Bhagmati. The Indian experts tried to argue their case on saving the Calcutta port. Finally, a decision was reached whereby Pakistan engineers were to Visit-Farakka. Pakistan had also accepted to have

4. Bindra, S.S., n.2, p.19.

5. Bains, J.S., "The Farakka Barrage: International Law Aspects", Modern Review, (New York) vol. CXII, no.5, p.366.

the Indian engineers inspect their Ganga Kobadak Project in East Pakistan, which Pakistan claimed was being planned to irrigate three and half million acres of land.⁶ India rejected the suggestion made by Pakistan which clamoured for a third party to use its good offices to resolve the deadlock over the utilization of the water of the eastern rivers.⁷ The deliberations which concluded on 26 May, became fruitless as no agreement was reached because of the Pakistani stand on adjudication by a third party which was not acceptable to India.⁸

Talks were again held on the Farakka issue in December 1968. The five day Indo-Pakistan Secretary-level talks ended in fiasco in New Delhi on 19 December 1968. The only gain of the talks was the Pakistani willingness to provide certain data which it had earlier withheld.⁹

Several rounds of talks were held in 1969-70 but to no avail. Pakistan's objective was mainly to deceive the East Pakistanis by posing that it had interest in their affairs and to divert the attention of the opposition parties to something else.¹⁰

6. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 17 May 1968.

7. The Times of India (New Delhi), 23 May 1968.

8. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 27 May 1968.

9. Asian Recorder (New Delhi), 22-28 January 1969, pp.872-29.

10. Bindra, S.S., n.2., p.101.

DISPUTE OVER THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS

Pakistan became independent on 14 August 1947, and on that day the cash balance of India were about four thousand million rupees. Pakistan demanded that she be given one thousand million rupees as her share, but this was not acceptable to India. The issue was referred to an Arbitral Tribunal which fixed Pakistan's share at 750 million rupees.¹¹ India refused to give Pakistan her share. India's refusal was based on her intention to link the issue with the settlement of Kashmir issue. Sardar Patel declared that the implementation of the agreement was to be, as far as possible, simultaneous with the settlement of the Kashmir issue¹² Pakistan Finance Minister at a Press Conference at Karachi on 8 January 1948 declared that, 'At no stage of the discussions, which led to the signing of the agreement, was the question of Kashmir ever mentioned or considered, if it had been, Pakistan would never have been a party to the agreement.'¹³

In a bid to reconcile the issue, Mahatma Gandhi on 13 January 1948 went on an indefinite fast to press for harmony among all communities. The fast was equally a

11. Das Gupta, J.B., Indo-Pakistan Relations (Amsterdam, 1958), p.46.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

protest against the decision of India not to hand over Pakistan's share to her. However, on 15 January, the Indian Prime Minister Secretariat accepted to give Pakistan her share.¹⁴

COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE RESERVE BANK OF INDIA

It was agreed by both countries before the partition, that the Reserve Bank of India would act as the banker and currency authority for both India and Pakistan until 1 October 1948, when Pakistan was expected to set up its own banking and currency authority. On 8 January 1948, Pakistan's Finance Minister, Mr. Ghulam Muhammad, said at a Press Conference at Karachi, that India had interfered with the Reserve Bank of India in discharge of its duties towards Pakistan and described India's action "as an act of aggression".¹⁵ The Indian Finance Minister, Mr. Chetty denied the Pakistani allegation and as a reply on 12 January, he said, 'I can say categorically that in fact there has been no interference'.¹⁶ Pakistan took the matter to the Security Council of the United Nations on 15 January, 1948 and charged India of designs to destroy her monetary and

14. Ibid.

15. The Statesman (New Delhi) 9 January 1948.

16. Ibid, 13 January, 1948.

currency fabric. The issue was latter abandoned as Pakistan set up her own State Bank on 1 July 1948.¹⁷

DIVISION OF MILITARY STORES

On the division of Military Stores, Pakistan charged India for failing to supply her with the Military Stores she was due to have from India and that India had taken this stand because she wanted to keep Pakistan perpetually militarily weak.¹⁸

In view of the undeclared war between the two countries over Kashmir and in the context of India's handling of the financial agreement, it would not be strange if India did, in fact, withheld supplies of arms to Pakistan.

TRADE DISPUTE

Since the partition was based on political and religious grounds rather than economic considerations, a trade dispute erupted between the two countries. An agreement was signed on 5 August 1947, the agreement supported free flow of goods between the two countries until 29 February 1948, and that no barrier of any kind would be set up.¹⁹

17. Das Gupta, J.B., n.11. p.48.

18. Ibid, p.49.

19. White Paper on Indo-Pakistan Trade Relations, 15 August 1947-31 December 1949, (New Delhi, 1950) Annexure 1, Standstill Agreement. pp.1-4.

However, dispute erupted as both India and Pakistan advanced different interpretations to the agreement.²⁰ India refused to share the jute and excise duty with Pakistan. Pakistan declared that it reserved the right to revise the agreement.²¹

To reconcile this issue, an agreement was signed on 26 May 1948 for facilitating trade but both countries did not agree on prices and tariff rates. Despite the charges and counter-charges of the violations of the agreement, the two countries entered into a fresh agreement on 24 June, 1949.²² The trade relations between the two countries further suffered a set back because of the devaluation of Indian rupees, while Pakistan refused to devalue her own currency.²³

DISPUTES OVER THE INDIAN STATES

At the lapse of the British paramountcy in August 1947, the Princely States were given options of either to accede to India or to Pakistan or to remain independent. Gradually, the princely states decided their options with the exception of the rulers of Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir.

20. Ibid., pp.10-11.

21. Ibid., p.4.

22. Das Gupta, J.B., n.11. p.51.

23. Ibid.

Junagadh

On 15 August 1947, Junagadh announced its decision to accede to Pakistan and issued a communique to that effect. But India did not like this decision and tried to make the ruler of Junagadh change his mind in favour of India, but this could not happen. Soon after, the situation in Junagadh started deteriorating and on 9 November 1947, India took over the administration of Junagadh. The Pakistan Government protested against the Indian action and demanded the reinstatement of the Nawab.²⁴

In an effort to solve the issue, a plebiscite was held on 20 February 1948 and the result favoured India.²⁵

The Pakistan Government never welcomed this development and declared that Indian action was an act of aggression against her and protested to the security council of the United Nations.²⁶

Later on, Mr Menon and Lord Mountbatten intervened to avert, what might have become a source of serious conflict between the two countries as a result, Junagadh acceded to India.²⁷

24. The Times of India (New Delhi) 12 November 1947.

25. Menon, V.P., The Story of the Integration of the Indian States (Bombay, 1961) p.142.

26. Ibid.

27. Das Gupta, J.B., n.11, pp.66-68.

Hydrabad

The ruler of Hydrabad never wanted to accede to either India or Pakistan but to remain independent. However, on 29 November 1947, the Indian Government signed an agreement with the ruler of Hydrabad and it was expected that the agreement would ultimately lead to the accession of Hydrabad to India. Soon, the internal situation in the state worsened. The delay to accede to India was considered as a 'stop-gap measure to strengthen its independence'. The happenings there forced India to take 'police action' against the Nizam, and so on 13 September 1948, the Indian forces marched into Hydrabad, and took over the administration on 18 September 1948. Pakistan protested against the Indian action to the security council of the United Nations.²⁸

Kashmir

Like some other rulers of the Indian States, Maharaja Hari Singh was undecided as to whether to accede to India or to Pakistan or to remain independent. But when tribal raiders, who were openly supported by the Pakistan government raided Kashmir, the Maharaja agreed to Kashmir's accession to India and signed the instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947. Pakistan termed this as an act of aggression by India.²⁹

28. Das Gupta, J.B., n.11. pp.66-73.

29. Menon, V.P., n.25. pp.377-81.

India referred the issue to the Security Council as it threatened the maintenance of peace and security. Ever since, the issue stands a thorn in the relations of both the countries. All efforts to resolve it taken by India have never found favour with Pakistan.

When on 19 July 1967 an official bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha, by V.C. Shukla, the then Minister of State for Home Affairs to extend Federal Laws to Kashmir, Pakistan protested.³⁰ This amounted to interference in India's internal affairs.

No doubt, the ruling as well as the opposition elites of Pakistan, have been fanning the Kashmir issue in order to enlist the sympathies of the people and to divert their attention from domestic problems facing them.

'Since 1948, the Kashmir issue had been debated in the United Nations Security Council several times and several missions were sent by the Council'.³¹ However, all these efforts have failed to break the ice, rather it has complicated the issue.

30. The Statesman (New Delhi) 16 September, 1966.

31. Bindra, S.S., n.2. p.29.

HINDU-MUSLIM RIVALRY

Hinduism and Islam are two different religions, having different view points in every field of life.

During the freedom struggle, the Muslim League was considered to be the sole organization of the Muslims, while the Indian National Congress was considered to be an organization of the Hindus. The activities of the leading politicians who were religiously carried away paved the way for the birth of Pakistan. If the Hindus had treated the Muslims fairly, there would not have been Pakistan today.³² The congress lack the ability to deal with the various crisis between the Hindus and the Muslims.³³ The creation of Pakistan therefore, gave the Hindu-Muslim rivalry a permanent status.³⁴

With this background, both India and Pakistan have been watching each other with hatred, mistrust, suspicion and fear. Pakistan presumes that India has not reconciled herself to the partition and the slightest opportunity given her, she would destroy Pakistan. Ayub Khan in his autobiography wrote that: "India's ambition was to absorb Pakistan or turn her into a satellite".³⁵ Similarly, India

32. Aziz, K.K., The Making of Pakistan - A Study in Nationalism (London, 1967) p.184.

33. Ibid,, p.336.

34. Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam, India Wins Freedom (London, 1960) p.265.

35. Khan, M.A., Friends Not Masters: A political autobiography (London, 1967) p.115.

has the apprehension that Pakistan would go against her at the least opportunity.³⁶

IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES

Ideology plays an important role in the issue of "conflict and harmony". All the known definitions stress the essential elements, a system of beliefs and its relationship to political action. Ideology and social conditions are inter-related and there is some sort of interplay between them. Pakistan is dedicated to Islam while India has devoted herself to secularism.³⁷

The struggle for Pakistan was based on ideology. It was a demand for a homeland for Muslims. In the words of Ayub Khan, "Allah in his infinite mercy, created Pakistan to give the Muslims of these regions a homeland in which to mould their lives in accordance with the fundamental principles and the spirit of Islam".³⁸

The Islamic character has thus created the minority problem. The people of Pakistan consider India as a home for Hindus. The politicians of Pakistan always tell fairy stories about the Indian Muslims.

36. Ibid.

37. Joseph Frankel, International Politics - Conflict and harmony (London, 1969) p.98.

38. See, President's manifesto issued on the eve of President Mohammed Ayub Khan's election to his second term of office. Khan, M.A., n.35. pp.250-3.

PAKISTAN AND MILITARY PACTS

The decision of Pakistan to join the western military pacts - South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) further deteriorated the relations between the two countries.

Referring to the motives of Pakistan joining these military pacts, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan Feroz Khan, said: "We want them (members of the Baghdad pact) for our defence... Our first duty is to strengthen our defence particularly against India no matter what others might say".³⁹

According to Ayub Khan, the main consideration of Pakistan entering into military pacts was to oblige the US which had been giving Pakistan considerable economic help.⁴⁰ Another factor that led to Pakistan entering into military pacts, was that the economic and political situations in Pakistan was in an ugly shape.⁴¹ But the US objectives were to have an ally in Asia, and to have an edge in Eastern Asia in case of war with the USSR and China.⁴²

39. The Pakistan Times (Lahore) 8 December 1956.

40. Khan, M.A., n.35, pp.155-7.

41. Karunakaran, K.P., India in World Affairs, February 1950-December 1953, (Calcutta, 1958) p.150.

42. Gupta, H.R., The Kutch Affairs (Delhi, 1969) p.26.

This action of Pakistan entering into military alliances directly affected the Indo-Pakistan relations. The pacts stripped Pakistan of the free hands in taking an independent stand in her relations with India as she has to get prior permission of the western powers.⁴³

INDIA'S FRIENDSHIP WITH USSR

The relations between India and the USSR started growing for the first time in 1952, when Jacob Malik in his speech in the Security Council of the United Nations accused the United Kingdom and the United States of interfering in the internal affairs of Kashmir, he particularly accused the US of seeking military base in the Pakistan held Kashmir.⁴⁴

The USSR came closer to India because of the latter's policy of non-alignment which suited the soviet objective of checking the growing menace posed by the US military alliances.⁴⁵

During the visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin to India, they publicly declared that Kashmir was an integral part

43. Sasadhar Sinha, India Independence in Perspective (Bombay, 1947) p.226.

44. Bazaz, P.N., Kashmir in Crucible (New Delhi, 1967) p.117.

45. Chopra Pran, India's Second Liberation (Delhi, 1973) p.11.

of India.⁴⁶ In 1959, Ayub Khan suggested that both India and Pakistan should settle their prevailing disputes and work out a plan for the joint defence of the sub-continent.⁴⁷ Nehru rejected this on the ground that it would look like a military pact with Pakistan.⁴⁸ The situation in the sub-continent took a turn for the worse with the refusal of Nehru to go into a joint defence plan with Ayub Khan, and thereafter, Pakistan started moving close to China.

THE SINO-INDIAN WAR OF 1962

Pakistan has been searching for an opportunity for invigorating her bonds of friendship with China, and this came handy in the course of the Sino-India war of 1962. Pakistan immediately sided with China and criticized India for "attacking" China.

Supporting the Chinese aggression against India, the Pakistani President declared that the Chinese just wanted to secure their frontiers and that the first blow was given by India.⁴⁹ Meanwhile, the US and the UK condemned

46. Budhraj, V.S., Soviet Russia and the Hindustan Sub-continent (Bombay, 1973), p.102.

47. The Dawn (Karachi) 27 October 1959.

48. The Statesman (New Delhi) 3 November, 1959.

49. The Dawn (Karachi) 30 October 1962.

the chinese action and sympathized with India. The India Government appealed for help to the US and it responded positively.⁵⁰ The decision of some Western countries to arm India against China was not welcomed by Pakistan, who claimed that the Sino-India war was a mere "camouflage by India for getting more Western weapons to be used against her".⁵¹

SINO-PAK RELATIONS

During the Korean crisis, Pakistan enlisted China's hostility as the former supported the US. But when Pakistan aligned herself with the Western countries, China did not protest, but accepted it mildly. The Chinese rightly asserted that Pakistan's membership of SEATO was only directed against India.⁵²

At the Bandung Conference in 1955, the then Pakistan Prime Minister, convinced his Chinese counter-part Prime Minister Chou-En-Lai of Pakistan's objectives in entering the Western military alliance. Ever since, the relations between China and Pakistan have been cordial, and this explains why Pakistan sided with China in the Sino-India war of 1962.⁵³

50. Ranga, N.G., Fight for Freedom (New Delhi, 1968). p.149.

51. The Pakistan Times(Lahore) 1 November 1962.

52. Brines, Russel, Indo-Pakistan Conflict (Bombay, 1970), p.182.

53. Goswami, B.N., Pakistan and China - A Study of their Relations (Bombay, 1972) pp.30-41.

On 2 March 1963, China and Pakistan hurried into an agreement regarding the Sino-Pakistan border.⁵⁴ The Indian Government condemned this agreement as she saw in it, a plan by China to defeat the Indo-Pakistan talks which had achieved some progress at that time. After the agreement, a broad understanding developed between China and Pakistan, and Pakistan started making plans to once again grab Kashmir by force as she was sure of Chinese help in an event of war with India. Z.A. Bhutto declared, "an attack from India on Pakistan is no longer confined to the security and the internal integrity of Pakistan. An attack from India on Pakistan involves the territorial integrity of the largest state in Asia".⁵⁵

THE KUTCH CONFLICT

Pakistan had created trouble in Kutch in a bid to test the effectiveness of the US weapons in her possession and to test the effectiveness of her army. The Kutch episode of April-May 1965 further worsened the Indo-Pakistan relations. The British government intervention led to a cease-fire by the two countries.⁵⁶

54. The Dawn (Karachi) 3 March 1963.

55. Pakistan National Assembly Debates. vol.II, 17 July 1963, p.666.

56. Gupta, H.R., Indo-Pakistan War. vol.1, (New Delhi 1967) p.57.

INDO-PAKISTAN WAR OF 1965

India and Pakistan fought a war in August-September 1965. The cause of the war was the attempt made by Pakistan to settle the Kashmir issue by force. India resorted to counter offensive and eventually Malaysia moved a resolution in the Security Council of the United Nations on 4 September 1965. She proposed an immediate cease-fire in Kashmir without branding Pakistan as an aggressor,⁵⁷ and treated both the aggressed (India) and the aggressor (Pakistan) alike. This resolution failed to stop the war.

The efforts of the United Nations Secretary General U. Thant to stop the war also failed.⁵⁸

During the war, China took side with Pakistan and charged the Soviet-American "collusion with having encouraged India to acquire Pakistan's territory".⁵⁹ At the termination of the war, the USSR initiated and convened a meeting of the two countries at Tashkent which led to the signing of Tashkent agreement between India and Pakistan.⁶⁰

HOSTILE PROPAGANDA

According to Article iv of the Tashkent Declaration
"both sides will discourage any propaganda directed against

57. Res/209, 4 September 1965.

58. Gupta, H.R., India-Pakistan War, 1965, vol.II (Delhi, 1968), pp.226-7.

59. Anwar Sayeed. "China and the India-Pakistan War of 1965", Orbis, vol, IX no.3, 1965, p.860.

60. Bindra, S.S., n.2. p.39.

the other country and will encourage propaganda which promotes the development of friendly relations between the two countries". But this article was not implemented.

Pakistani leaders, press and radio soon after the withdrawal of troops started a hostile propaganda against India. India informed the USSR about the Pakistan resumption of anti-India propaganda and the USSR advised her not to retaliate. It is perhaps believed that Pakistan resumed this anti-India propaganda in a bid to satisfy a section of the Pakistanis who did not like the Tashkent Declaration.⁶¹

Pakistan also alleged that India had resumed anti-Pakistan propaganda. The India counter propaganda carried less weight as compared to that of Pakistan. The 1967 General elections led India to anti-Pakistan mood. Both countries took to this action in order to outdo the opposition parties in their respective countries.⁶²

BORDER VIOLATIONS

The shooting down of Pakistan military plane which Pakistan claimed was a civilian plane within the Indian territory further strained the relations between the two countries.⁶³

61. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 25 March 1966.

62. Asian Recorder (New Delhi) 28 April 1967 pp.7619-34.

63. The Statesman (New Delhi) 3 February 1967.

On 3 February 1967, an Indian Defence Ministry spokesman pointed out that during the past year there had been over seventy air violations.⁶⁴ The Rajasthan Home Minister gave a similar testimony that in the Rajasthan Sector, two hundred and thirty-seven cases of Pakistani intrusion had been reported since January 1966.⁶⁵

The Pakistan Government also complained of several border violations. Pakistan asked India to stop those activities in the interest of peace and tranquillity of the area,⁶⁶ India however dismissed the Pakistani protest.⁶⁷

EXPULSION OF DIPLOMATS

A clerk of the Pakistani High Commission in New Delhi, S.A. Shah, was caught while engaged in espionage in July 1967 and was ordered to leave India within 48 hours. On another occasion, a minor functionary of the Pakistan mission Anwar Ahmed was involved in a spying case.⁶⁸ In retaliation, Pakistan Government ordered three officials of the Indian High Commission on 23 August 1967 to leave the country within 24 hours. It was alleged that the three officials had been doing organized espionage and were caught

64. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 4 February 1967.

65. The Times of India (New Delhi) 19 June 1967.

66. The Dawn (Karachi) 5 August 1967.

67. The Statesman (New Delhi) 6 August 1967.

68. The Times of India (New Delhi) 20 July 1967.

redhanded along with two of their Pakistani accomplices while receiving "classified Government documents"⁶⁹. Pakistan was only retaliating by expelling the Indian diplomats says Hitavada, it wrote:

"It was obvious that Pakistan was trying to retaliate against India's action in recently expelling a clerk in the Pak High Commission".⁷⁰ Expulsion of Indian diplomats continued under the guise of Agartala conspiracy case.

The Pakistan Government also described Ahmed's expulsion as a "measure of petty retaliation",⁷¹ in a protest note to India.

AGARTALA CONSPIRACY CASE

President Ayub Khan's regime implicated some Indian officers and some leaders of East Pakistan in a conspiracy known as Agartala conspiracy case.

According to the Pakistan Government, the plot involved an armed revolt with weapons supplied by India. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the leader of the Awami League who was at that time in jail was also one of the alleged conspirators. Four of the accused made judicial confessions.

69. The Dawn (Karachi) 24 August 1967.

70. The Hitavada, (ed.) "Deplorable Action" 26 August 1967.

71. The Times of India (New Delhi) 8 January 1968.

However, a movement was launched in both wings of Pakistan demanding the withdrawal of the Agartala Conspiracy case and he finally bowed to the demands of the people. The withdrawals, Herbert wrote: of all the reverses which Ayub Khan suffered in the course of his ten years' administration, this was the most serious and most humiliating. It was inflicted by East Pakistan and it was the outcome of his duel with Mujibur Rehman and of his effort to crush the six-point movement.⁷²

Pakistan's allegation of Indian involvement in the case was mainly to malign India in the eyes of the world. Pakistan's other motive in alleging Indian involvement was to enlist the sympathy of the Soviet Union by creating an impression that India was not implementing the Tashkent Declaration.

AUCTION OF INDIAN PROPERTY

According to Article viii of the Tashkent Declaration both India and Pakistan agreed "to discuss the return of the property and assets taken over by either side in connection with the conflict". But Pakistan went contrary to this article by its decision to sell the Indian property

72. Feldman, Herbert, From Crisis to Crisis. (London 1967) p.189.

that were taken over by her during the 1965 conflict. Further, in 1967, Pakistan forcefully seized numerous properties belonging to resident minorities in East Pakistan and then declared these to be enemy property.⁷³

India protested to Pakistan against the sale of these property but to no avail. Criticizing the Pakistan behaviour in this connection, the Statesman wrote that the Pakistan decision "runs counter to the specific provisions made in the Declaration and it may perhaps be pointless to talk about international law to the Government of Pakistan."⁷⁴

ARMS AID

Soon after the termination of the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, both countries started accusing each other of collecting arms and ammunition.

During the war of 1965, the US stopped arms supplies to both the countries. From August 1966, both the countries started accusing each other of acquiring arms and weapons.⁷⁵

On 12 April 1967 the US announced its decision to terminate military assistance to both India and Pakistan

73. See, the statement of B.R. Bhagat, Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs, Lok Sabha Debates, vol. XXII, no.13, 27 November 1968, Cols. 148-58.

74. The Statesman (New Delhi) (ed.) "Pinpricks from pindi", 9 November 1968.

75. The Pakistan Times (Lahore) 11 August 1966, see Lok Sabha Debates, vol. LVIII, no 11, 8 August 1966. Cols. 3236-39, also see the Dawn (Karachi) 24 March 1966.

on a grant basis, but it re-opened the door of the sale of spare parts for military equipments already supplied. This was not beneficial to India but to Pakistan. This is so because India did not use the US weapons against Pakistan in the 1965 war, moreover, Pakistan received more military aid as compared to what India received. India expressed its apprehension about the US action when a Government spokesman said that the US decision "will pose a threat again to India".⁷⁶

The Indian press also reported the sales of arms to Pakistan by the USSR and West Germany.⁷⁷

Moscow, probably might have done this in an attempt to wean Pakistan away from China but she failed. China also supplied Pakistan arms and weapons in a bid to replace Pakistan losses during the 1965 conflict.⁷⁸

The decision of the US to rearm Pakistan after the 1965 conflict was to wean away Pakistan from her communist supporters and to have her stay in the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), but the US failed to achieve these objectives.

76. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 13 April 1967.

77. Asian Recorder (New Delhi) 20-26 August 1967, pp.7872-3.

78. Lok Sabha Debates n.75. cols.3236-39.

INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS

According to Article iii of the Tashkent Declaration which says: "the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that relations between India and Pakistan shall be based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other," but this was ignored. Both the countries accused each other of interfering in its internal affairs.

The Indian Government alleged that Pakistan supplied arms and ammunition to Nagas and Mizos and gave them training facilities for guerrilla warfare. On 12 May 1966, G.L. Nanda, the then Indian Minister of Home Affairs stated in the Lok Sabha, that Pakistan had supplied arms to Nagas. He stated also that there were reports that some groups of hostile Nagas and other tribes, were given training at certain places in East Pakistan.⁷⁹ On this count, India restrained itself, and was not prepared even to raise the Pakhtoonistan issue in the United Nations.⁸⁰

THE HIJACKING OF AN INDIAN PLANE

The hijacking of an Indian Airlines Fokker Friendship plane to Lahore by the so called National Liberation Front

79. Lok Sabha Debates, vol.LV, no 58, 12 May 1966, Cols. 16324-25.

80. Lok Sabha Debates, vol.V, no.30, 3 July 1967, Cols. 8973-74.

widened the gulf between the two countries. The plane was eventually blown up in Pakistan by the hijackers,⁸¹ and the Pakistan Government granted the hijackers asylum.⁸²

While Mrs Indira Gandhi held Pakistan responsible for the incident and warned her of dire "consequences", Z.A.Bhutto praised the so called "freedom fighters" and Mujibur Rehman condemned the hijacking and demanded an inquiry into the whole affairs.

The Secretary-General of the Awami League, Tajuddin Ahmad, denounced the blowing up of the plane as "a conspiracy by West Pakistan to deprive the East Pakistan people of the possibility of establishing democratic rule in the country".⁸³ India demanded compensation for the damaged plane, and on 3 February 1971, she banned the flights of the Pakistan planes over her territory.⁸⁴

The demands for compensation and handing over the hijackers were rejected by Pakistan who claimed that the hijackers were "not Indian nationals" and therefore, there was no question of their being handed over to India. Radio Pakistan described the hijackers as "Kashmiri freedom fighters".⁸⁵

81. The Pakistan Observer, 2 February 1971.

82. Radio Pakistan News Bulletin (New Delhi) 1 February 1971, p.4.

83. Link 4 February 1971.

84. The Pakistan Observer 4 February 1971

85. National Herald, 7 February 1971.

DIPLOMATIC TUSSLE

When on 18 April 1971, the Pakistan Deputy High Commissioner, Hussain Ali, changed his loyalty from Pakistan to Bangladesh, a diplomatic war erupted between India and Pakistan,⁸⁶ following the Pakistan High Commissioner in New Delhi, Sajjad Haider's note to the External Affairs Ministry on 20 April, requesting the Indian Government to hand over the premises of the Deputy High Commissioner to Mahdi Masud who would now work as Deputy High Commissioner.⁸⁷ India regarded the scramble for the premises as an internal affair of Pakistan.⁸⁸

FURTHER BORDER VIOLATIONS

Both India and Pakistan accused each other of border violations. On 15 April 1971, India protested to Pakistan against the "wanton and unprovoked aggressive acts of the Pakistan armed forces" along the India - East Pakistan border.⁸⁹ The Pakistan troops burnt a number of houses in Bashapachai, it also fired on the Indian border outposts at Belonia and Sone Mura in Tripura. The troops equally entered Boyra Village in 24 parganas district and gunned

86. The Statesman (New Delhi) 19 April 1971.

87. Ibid., 21 April 1971.

88. Ibid., 23 April 1971.

89. Ibid., 16 April 1971.

down five persons.⁹⁰ On the Kashmir border, two Mirage fighters of the Pakistan Air force flew low over the Srinagar Airport for espionage activities, and India lodged a protest with Pakistan.⁹¹ The Indian protest was rejected by Pakistan and described the India's charges as "completely baseless and malicious".⁹²

In July, when the situation became highly dangerous, the Indian Government instructed its Border Security Force to reply effectively to any attempt by the Pakistani army to violate the Indian territory either by intrusion, bombing or firing across the border. This was stated by K.C. Pant, the then Minister for Home Affairs, during a debate in the Lok Sabha over the repeated Pakistani provocations on the eastern border.⁹³

PAKISTAN'S SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

A spy ring called Al-Fatah, with a plan to assassinate the Chief Minister G.M. Sadiq and his colleagues, was smashed by the Kashmir police in early January 1971,⁹⁴ and the Indian Government held the opinion that the Pakistan High Commission in New Delhi was involved. And so,

90. Ibid., 29 April 1971.

91. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 23 July 1971.

92. The Motherland 26 July 1971.

93. Lok Sabha Debates, vol.VI, no.49, 29 July 1971, Cols. 135-46.

94. Indian Express, 6 January 1971.

on 24 January, Zafar Iqbal, First Secretary of the Pakistan High Commission in New Delhi was expelled for its involvement in the activities of Al-Fatah organization.⁹⁵

Pakistan retaliated by expelling B.L. Joshi, First Secretary of the Indian High Commission in Islamabad, alleging his engagement in "espionage" activities.⁹⁶

In the second week of August 1971, Pakistan's agents again started subversive activities. On 14 August, they blew up a goods train between Bhanga and Chargola stations on the Silchar sector of the North-Eastern Frontier Railway in Cachar District of Assam bordering East Pakistan.⁹⁷ Three bogies of a relief train which was rushed to the scene from Badarpur also ran into Mine in the vicinity.⁹⁸ It was estimated that at least four hundred trained Pakistani agents were arrested in Assam and Meghalaya since the evacuees from East Pakistan started coming to India.⁹⁹

While Pakistani spies were on the one hand busy blowing up trains, the Pakistan Government was on the other

95. The Hindu (Madras) 24 January 1971.

96. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 25 January 1971.

97. The Hindu (Madras) 15 August 1971.

98. Ibid.

99. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 31 August 1971.

making proposals for reduction of tension between her and India.

The Pakistan permanent representative at the United Nations, suggested good offices of the security council to visit the areas of tension on the border.¹⁰⁰

The Pakistan Government's move was to convert the ongoing war between her and East Pakistan into an Indo-Pakistan problem. She had created the tension and surprisingly was making proposals for diffusing same.

Now, why did Pakistan indulge herself in such subversive activities ? In the first place, her aim was to create panic in the minds of the people that the law and order situation had broken down in India. Secondly, she wanted to disrupt the relief supplies to the East Pakistan refugees. Thirdly, Pakistan wanted to create an East Pakistan - like situation in Assam where a large number of Muslims were living, who were previously citizens of East Pakistan and lastly, she needed information regarding the Indian military installations and locations so that in an event of war, they could be destroyed with ease.¹⁰¹ These factors seriously strained the relations between the two countries as a result of the political

100. The Motherland, 18 August 1971.

101. Bindra, S.S., n.2. p.167.

upheaval in Pakistan. However, after the 1971 crisis, certain agreements between India and Pakistan were concluded by which 5,000 sq. miles of Pakistani territory was vacated by the Indian troops; 93,000, Pakistanis prisoners of war (POW's) were repatriated from India to Pakistan, Bangladesh was recognized by Pakistan, trade was resumed between India and Pakistan, diplomatic relations were restored, communications were re-established, the train link was restored, and a long term framework for normalization of relations was laid down.¹⁰²

Though the military junta in Pakistan have been remarkable in the use of sweet language, reasonable tone and uninhibited charm. Vis-a-vis India. Yet, the record of behaviour has not given much cause for hope. Despite the conclusion of certain agreements in peripheral areas like consular matters, tourism, communications, agricultural technology, etc. numerous meetings between the two countries at Ministerial and official levels on expansion of trade ties, free flow of information and culture or signing of a Treaty of No-war/Peace, cooperation and friendship have yielded no results.

102. Kumar, S., "India Pakistan Tensions" The Hindustan Times, 1 October 1985.

That the confidence level between the two countries has gone down does not have to be proved. The siachin Glacier incidents continuing since the middle of 1984, the Indian perception of Pakistan's role in the "Khalistan" issue, are evidences. Pakistan on its part was critical of India for its alleged role in the Sind agitation of 1983.¹⁰³

Raising the level of confidence between the two countries is therefore important and this could only be done on the willingness of both the countries, but this may never happen at least for now as both countries appears not to be really keen in the improvement of relations between them.

103. Ibid.

CHAPTER-II

INDIA AND THE EMERGENCE OF BANGLADESH

Following the election results, the first ever to be held in Pakistan in December 1970, there emerged a struggle for power between the Awami League and the Pakistan People's Party. The Awami League recorded a sweeping victory in East Pakistan by capturing 98.4 per cent of the seats allotted to East Pakistan in the National Assembly, while the Pakistan People's Party secured 58.7 per cent of the seats. In the provincial assemblies, the Awami League captured 96 per cent of the total number of seats allotted to East Pakistan, but enlisted the support of 99.3 per cent on its basic six point programme in that the National Awami Party, the Pakistan Democratic Party and the independents were with it. In West Pakistan, the Pakistan People's Party captured just 50 per cent of the total seats allotted to West Pakistan.¹ The victory of the Awami League threatened the power of West Pakistan military and economic elites and also the recontinnence of economic benefits derived from East Pakistan.² The struggle ultimately led to a war in December 1971 between India and Pakistan and heralded the

1. Bangladesh Documents, vol. 1 (New Delhi, Govt. of India), p.130.
2. Vayrymen, R., "Bangladesh - An outcome of Inequality and Imperialism", Tampere, Instant Research on Peace and Violence, no.3, 1971, pp.100-109.

birth of independent Bangladesh.

BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS

The root of the crisis in Pakistan which culminated in the emergence of independent Bangladesh lay in the very structure of Pakistan.³

Pakistan was constituent of two wings, the East and the West, separated by a distance of one thousand miles of India territory. This separation was a great disadvantage.⁴ Added to this disadvantageous physical separation was the divergent cultural heritage of the two wings of Pakistan. These two factors were perhaps the most significant factors that struck the wide contrast between the two wings of Pakistan.⁵

The other factors that highlighted the growing differences between the two wings of Pakistan was the language issue. The East Pakistanis were not prepared to give up their Bengali language and culture for Urdu language the official language of West Pakistan.⁶

Coupled with the above factors was the economic injustice melted on the East Pakistan.⁷

3. The New York Times (Inter. Ed.) 14 April 1971.

4. Rahamthulla, B., Indo-American Politics, (New Delhi, 1980), p.25.

5. Ibid., p.45.

6. Chowdhury, S.R., The Genesis of Bangladesh - A study in international legal norms and permissive conscience. (Bombay, 1972), p.58.

7. Lewis, R., Pakistan: Industrialization and trade policies (London, 1970) pp.142-43.

Contrary to the commonly accepted opinion, the two wings of Pakistan had very little in common. During a debate in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on the 1956 Constitution Bill, Abul Mansur said: 'Pakistan is a unique country, having two wings which... differ in all matters excepting two things - a common religion and a common struggle, with the exception of these two things, all other factors, viz. the language, the traditions, the culture, the costume, the dietary, the calender, the standard time, practically everything is different. There is in fact, nothing common to the two wings, particularly in respect of those things which are the sine qua non to form a nation'.⁸

Under these conditions, the unity of Pakistan was very much doubted and the emergence of Bangladesh signifies nothing unique.

PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT'S STEP MOTHERLY TREATMENT

The Pakistan Government that had most of its officers from the west adopted a clear policy of step-motherly treatment against East Pakistan in political, cultural, social, economic and administrative spheres. From the onset, the people of East Pakistan had occupied

8. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, vol.1 p.1816 January 1956.

themselves with the thoughts of their future in respect to West Pakistan high-handedness towards them. The Bengali members in the Constituent Assembly were denied the right to speak in their own Mother tongue. What a humiliation, when they protested against this the Prime Minister of Pakistan Liaquat Ali Khan, himself replied:

"Pakistan is a Muslim State and it must have as its Lingua franca the language of the Muslim nation... The mover should realize that Pakistan has been created because of the demand of a hundred million Muslims in this sub-continent and the language of a hundred million Muslims is Urdu... It is necessary for a nation to have one language and that language can only be Urdu and no other language".⁹

Such utterances were against the assurances that were given to the representatives of East Pakistan before they accepted to join Pakistan, that on all matters they would get at least equal treatment. But the promises given seems to have gone to the dust. According to Rounaq Jahan "the cultural policy of the National elite gave a wider emotional appeal to the demand for autonomy and helped to develop a linguistic nationalism among the other classes of Bengalis". It was felt that there was only one way of

9. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, vol.II
25 February 1948. Motion moved by D.N. Dutta, p.15
replied to by Liaquat Ali Khan. p.17.

holding together the two wings i.e., by one language and one culture between them.¹⁰ Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah's famous Dacca speech of 1948 defending Urdu as the State language typified this view:

Let me make it very clear to you that the state language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language. Anyone who tries to mislead you is really the enemy of Pakistan. Without one state language, no nation can remain tied up solidly together and function.¹¹

When the Pakistan Government eventually declared Urdu as the national language of Pakistan, there were riots in Bengal as a protest against the cultural assimilationist approach, leading to the death of three students of Dacca University¹².

The Bengalis reacted violently because, according to the census figures of 1951, Bengali was the language of 54.6 per cent of East Pakistan while Urdu was the language of only 7.2 per cent.¹³ However, the constitution in 1956 recognised both Urdu and Bengali as national languages of Pakistan.

10. Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (London, 1972) p.37.

11. Jamilud Din Ahmad, (ed.), Speeches and writings of Mr. Jinnah, vol. II (Lahore, 1964) p.490.

12. Choudhury, G.W., "Bangladesh, why it happened?" International Affairs, vol.48, no.2, April 1972, p.247.

13. Costa Bendict, Dismemberment of Pakistan (Ludhiana, 1973) p.51.

Thus, the assimilationist cultural policy, rather than uniting the two wings, drove a wedge between them. It alienated the Bengali intelligentsia, the professionals and the students.¹⁴

To make things worse, all vital decisions as it relates to political, defence, economic or diplomatic matters, were arrived at by the ruling elite, which was composed mainly of West Pakistan civil and military officers. Looking at provincial matters, the situation was not in any way favourable to the Bengalis. All the posts in West Pakistan were occupied by West Pakistanis. In theory, however, there was a federal constitution in Pakistan, but practically the provincial Government was totally subordinated to the Centre, more particularly in financial as well as in administrative matters.¹⁵

The revelations of a group of scholars in Vienna, exposed vividly the discriminatory treatment meted out to East Pakistan in various fields. The study revealed the following:

On the average annual budget, East Pakistan provided 60 per cent against West Pakistan's 40 per cent of the total revenue, but it received just about 25 per cent for

14. Rounaq Jahan, n.10. p.38.

15. Ibid., p.203.

its expenditure against the remaining 75 per cent of West Pakistan. In foreign trade, East Pakistan exports constituted 59 per cent of the total but imports only 30 per cent which consisted of consumer goods and food. Nothing virtually was left for development projects. During 1958-69, West Pakistan's share was 41 per cent of the total foreign exchange earnings. Most of the development projects were set up in West Pakistan.¹⁶

So far as bureaucracy was concerned whether it be military or civil it was overwhelmingly drawn from the West. Till the date the military Junta seized power, there was not a single Bengali Secretary amongst the 19 Secretaries in the Central government, there were only two among the 50 Joint Secretaries, 10 among 135 deputy Secretaries, 30 among 130 under Secretaries and 16 among 151 assistant Secretaries. All the 9 members of the Press Commission were West Pakistanis, worse still was the position of Bengalis in the army in which they had only 5 per cent representation and that too was at the lower level.¹⁷

In the Public Health Sector, the situation was also shocking. The number of hospitals beds in 1968 in West Pakistan was estimated to be around 26,200 while that in

16. Bangladesh Documents, n.1. p.16.

17. Ibid., p.20.

East Pakistan was only 6,909. The number of doctors in West Pakistan was 12,400, whereas for East Pakistan it was merely 7,600; the number of rural health centres in West and East Pakistan were 325 and 88 respectively.¹⁸

In educational field, it was also a baleful state of affairs. The East Bengalis got 240 million against 520 million rupees for West Pakistan. This development stood to stop the intelligentsia growth of East Pakistan.¹⁹

Even before Sheikh Mujibur Rehman came into limelight in Pakistan politics, some prominent Bengali politicians had bitterly denounced this unhappy trend.²⁰ Even President Yahya Khan in an interview with a Newsweek correspondent admitted the fact that East Pakistan had never got its right share from the government of Pakistan. He said: "No one (leader) has ever treated the Bengalis fairly".²¹

It is against this discriminatory policy of the Pakistan Government that a movement for full autonomy was launched in East Pakistan after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan conflict. It was an attempt aimed at achieving self-

18. Chopra (ed.) The Challenge of Bangladesh. (New Delhi 1971) pp.79-101.

19. Bangladesh Documents n.1. p.20.

20. Sharma, R., Bangladesh Crisis and India Foreign Policy, (New Delhi 1978) p.40.

21. Newsweek, vol. 78, 8 November 1971, p.19.

sufficiency in defence and to accord full autonomy to it, since in the course of the 1965 conflict, East Pakistan was completely isolated from West Pakistan, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the Awami League leader, gave to the people of East Pakistan a six points programme. The six points formula which later became the main source of subsequent controversy, are as follows: The first asked for a federal state with all the characteristics of the Parliamentary form of government. The second sought to limit federal powers to defence and foreign affairs only; all others, including those of conducting foreign trade and financial control, being with the constituent units of which Bangladesh would be one. The third proposed separate currencies for the two wings or alternative safeguards to prevent inter-wing flight of capital. The fourth denied the centre the right of taxation and vested it in the hands of the federating units. The fifth dealt with economic disparities and how to remove them through a series of economic, fiscal and legal reforms. The last required setting up of a military or para-military force in order to contribute effectively towards national security.²²

An analysis of the six-points formula, vividly reveals that they were merely to redress the uneven state

22. Bangladesh Documents n.1. pp.23-33.

of affairs in Pakistan in political and economic spheres.

The formula received a tremendous welcome in East Pakistan and made the military regime shiver. The military regime's policy towards the six-points movement displayed its inability to respond politically to political demands.

Mujibur Rehman made the six-points negotiable but Ayub Khan failed to try his hands on negotiation, he decided to confront the Awami League leader and branded Mujibur Rehman's demands as "secessionist", "disruptionist", "a demand for greater Bengal" etc. during his tour of East Pakistan in March 1966.²³ But such accusations were hardly tenable in East Pakistan, and so the movement for autonomy went on despite all threats and the repressive policy of the Government. It generated so much heat that forced Ayub Khan to step down on 25 March 1969 and handed over power to the Army Commander-in-chief, General Yahya Khan.²⁴

In an address to the nation on 28 November 1969, President Yahya Khan declared: "My aim is to transfer power to the elected representatives of the people".²⁵

23. The Pakistan Observer, 15 March 1966.

24. The Dawn, (Karachi) 26 March 1969.

25. Ibid. 28 November 1969.

After the results of the election were announced, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was in a position to form the Government, while the Pakistan People's Party led by Z. Ali Bhutto emerged as the main opposition party. Bhutto being upset by the victory of the Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, declared that he was not ready to take its opposition benches in the National Assembly and that no constitution would be framed, nor could any government at the centre be run without his party's cooperation.²⁶

BATTLE FOR POWER BETWEEN THE AWAMI LEAGUE AND THE PAKISTAN PEOPLE'S PARTY

There erupted a struggle for power in Pakistan between the Awami League and the Pakistan People's Party led by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and Z.A. Bhutto respectively. Bhutto on 15 February 1971, declared in Peshawar that his party would not attend the National Assembly session starting on 3 March 1971 at Dacca unless it was made clear to him and his partymen that there would be some degree of reciprocity from the majority party, either publicly or privately.²⁷

Bhutto's decision and utterances met with harsh condemnations in the hands of Attaur Rehman, who was

26. Bindra, S.S. Indo-Pak Relations, (New Delhi, 1981), p.126.

27. The Dawn (Karachi), 16 February 1971.

the then Chief of the Pakistan National League when he described Bhutto's stand as a move to divide the country.²⁸ Maulana Bhashani the then President of the National Awami Party, described Bhutto's pre-conditions as a "threat" to East Pakistan.²⁹

On 28 February Bhutto demanded the postponement of the National Assembly session to facilitate fresh talks between his party and the Awami League.³⁰ Yahya Khan gave in and on 1 March in^a broadcast to the nation, announced the postponement of the National Assembly session. His reasons for this decision were that he felt that it was useless holding the session when the Pakistan People's Party as well as certain other parties had declared their intention of not attending, adding that "the general situation of tension created by India has further complicated the whole position".³¹ This Indian factor only confirmed the belief in East Pakistan that the destruction of the hijacked Indian plane and the various military and other measures adopted by Pakistan thereafter were all part of an attempt to create tension with India so as to provide the military regime with an excuse for withholding

28. The Pakistan Observer, 17 February 1971.

29. Ibid., 18 February 1971.

30. The Pakistan Times, 2 March 1971.

31. Ibid.

the transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people.

After the postponement of the National Assembly Session, which Mujibur Rehman described as a result of 'a deep rooted conspiracy' Mujibur's Awami League launched a civil disobedience movement. Strikes were observed all over East Pakistan.

In an effort to arrest the situation, President Yahya Khan invited twelve political leaders of both the wings to a round table conference on 10 March. But Mujibur Rehman refused to attend.³² On 6 March Yahya Khan conceded the popular demand and summoned the National Assembly on 25 March. At the same time, he appointed Lt. General Tikka Khan, a tough man in Pakistani military bureaucracy as Governor of East Bengal with the obvious intention that he would crush Mujibur Rehman and his party movement. It was rightly said that the postponement of the Assembly meeting was the beginning of the end. The end itself came 25 days later when the army was ordered to undertake a final solution of the East Bengal problem.

Mujibur Rehman responded by organizing a rally on 7 March and announced at that gathering that he was

32. Sharma, R., n.20. p.26.

not going to participate in the Assembly deliberations unless (i) Martial Law was lifted (ii) Pakistan army returned to the barracks (iii) enquiry was ordered into the killings in East Bengal and lastly (iv) Power was transferred to the people.³³

The effectiveness of the authority of Mujibur Rehman, compelled Yahya Khan to adopt a conciliatory attitude in his talks with him during the crucial period from 16 to 25 March.³⁴

At the end of the fruitless talks held at Dacca between President Yahya Khan and the representatives of the Awami League, the Pakistan People's Party and other parties, President Yahya Khan on 26 March banned all political activities throughout Pakistan.³⁵ On the same day before the President's broadcast, Mujibur Rehman declared East Pakistan as an independent State of Bangladesh.³⁶ G.W. Chowdhury is of the opinion that President Yahya Khan made the first and last attempt at putting the complicated relationship between East and West Pakistan on a sound political basis. Attributing reasons for the

33. The Dawn (Karachi) 8 March 1971.

34. Chowdhury, S.R., n.6. p.66.

35. The Dawn (Karachi) 27 March 1971.

36. The Statesman (New Delhi) 27 March 1971.

failure of Yahya Khan, Chowdhury feels that Yahya Khan failed because of the growing tension, suspicion and even hatred between the ruling elite of West Pakistan and the Bengali intelligentsia. The failure of Dacca talks was solely due to Bhutto and his friends in the army.³⁷ While Yahya Khan would be blamed for his misjudgement of the political situation in the eastern province³⁸, Bhutto and Mujibur Rehman failed to accommodate each other and thus paved the way for the military to occupy a key position of arbitrator. Bhutto was insisting on sharing of power because there was a psychological difficulty in West Pakistan in accepting the idea of Mujibur Rehman's domination at the centre. Bhutto's demands were turned down by Mujibur Rehman because he was never a popular figure in East Pakistan, his association with Ayub Khan in the past, his stand against the six-points in 1966 and his frequent meetings with Yahya Khan, the Generals and the members of the Civil Service, were the main reasons of his being disliked in East Pakistan.³⁹

INDIA AND THE EAST PAKISTAN CRISIS

The civil war which broke out in Pakistan and the atrocities committed by the Pakistan army on the unarmed

37. Chowdhury, G.W., "The last days of United Pakistan: A personal account", International Affairs, vol.49, no.4 April 1973, pp. 229-39.

38. Klatt, W., "The Indian sub-continent after the war" World Today, vol.28, March 1972, pp.109-10.

39. Rounaq Jahan, "Elite in Crisis: The failure of Mujib-Yahya Negotiations", Orbis, vol.17, no.2, 1973, p.595.

and defenceless people of East Pakistan, and the eventual dismemberment of Pakistan was a clear demonstration of Pakistan's failure to achieve national integration and the irresponsibility of the central leadership.

India became involved in the crisis due to the following factors. One, a major crisis point had emerged on India's doorsteps which had inevitable repercussions on India, particularly in view of the emotional overtones the crisis evoked on the Indian side. Secondly, the internal upheaval in East Pakistan created refugee problem for India which in turn gave rise to several others complicating issues, political, social as well as economic. Thirdly, the fear of the major powers who played some role in the crisis mainly for strategic reasons might turn the region into a second Vietnam crisis on a much largerscale.⁴⁰

After discussing the issue in a cabinet meeting and also with the opposition leaders in Parliament, India, adopted a cautious approach to the crisis, but Mrs Gandhi made it clear that the question of closing India's border against the refugees was not debatable as India would render humanitarian assistance to the refugees who might

40. Sharma, R., n.20, pp.56-57.

come into India, and that as a Government, it could not support a secessionist movement in a neighbouring country.⁴¹ This was to ward off international condemnation on India.

In the Lok Sabha, the members unanimously urged the government to help the East Pakistanis, by sending relief and medical aid, granting asylum to people who seek to cross over to India, raising the issue in international forums and evoking the Geneva Convention on "genocide" that was being committed against the East Pakistanis. Mrs Gandhi in her response to all these suggestions, expressed sympathy for the people of East Pakistan and said that the Government fully shared the agony, emotions and the deep concern of the people in India. She assured the House that the Government would take a decision regarding their suggestions shortly.⁴²

Meanwhile, the High Commissioner of Pakistan lodged a serious verbal protest alleging that India was interfering in her internal affairs. He condemned the coverage of the crisis in East Pakistan by Indian Newspapers and All India Radio as "false, mischievous and hostile". He also objected to the proceedings in the Indian Parliament

41. The Statesman (New Delhi) 28 March 1971.

42. Lok Sabha Debates, vol.1, no.7, 27 March 1971. cols. 42-43.

on the crisis on 27 March. India refused to entertain these protests of Pakistan, by informing the Pakistan High Commissioner that the newspapers and the All India Radio were free to report and broadcast all the information they could get. India also pointed out that the Government could not stop any member of the House or any politician in India from expressing his views.⁴³ The Lok Sabha demanded the immediate cessation of the use of force and the massacre of defenceless people. All along, India has been extending its moral support to the people of East Pakistan.

Thereafter, India started arousing world public opinion against the ruthless and barbaric repression in East Pakistan. She asked the USSR to use her good offices to put a stop to the ugly happenings in East Pakistan. The USSR was approached because of its role in normalisation of the Indo-Pakistan relations, especially in connection with the Tashkent Conference of 1966.⁴⁴ India also approached the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, U. Thant and members of the United Nations Security Council. The Indian Ambassador in the United Nations Samir Sen at a press conference said that the objective of these consulta-

43. The Statesman (New Delhi) 29 March 1971.

44. Ibid., 2 April 1971.

tions was to see how best the United Nations and international opinion could express itself in the crisis, without violating Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter which forbids interference in domestic affairs of member states. The impression at the United Nations headquarters was that the crisis was an "internal affairs" of Pakistan and that in any event, the situation at least in Dacca seemed to be under control of the Pakistan Government.⁴⁵

All these efforts by India clearly demonstrated that she was sincere in ending the crisis in Pakistan without outside interference. Pakistan termed the crisis as her internal affairs, but this was not, as the effects of what was happening in Pakistan was heavily felt in India.⁴⁶

India objected to the Pakistan stand on the grounds that, ten million Pakistanis had entered India without proper documents, these people had no means of livelihood and no means of returning to their country, the ten million people included some infiltrators and spies, India was not in a position to support these people without running into financial crisis of great magnitude and finally,

45. Ibid., 1 April 1971.

46. Sharma, R., n.20. p.43.

many of these people brought with them hazards of health which was capable of infecting the local population. The outbreak of cholera epidemic in the summer of 1971 speaks volume for what dangers were inherent in the movement of these refugees. Above all these, were the stories of Hindu persecution in East Bengal which were bound to create law and order problems in India.

As to why India permitted the refugees to enter its territory ? India felt it would be the height of inhumanity to close her border for those who sought shelter in India, its policy since 1947 allows persecuted people from either wing of Pakistan to enter India when they are persecuted and forced to leave Pakistan, public opinion in India would not tolerate the government to watch passively the mass massacre of Hindus in Pakistan. No government in India would have lasted a day if it refused the shelter seekers entry into India.⁴⁷

There is no denying the fact that the Indian Government had full sympathies with the liberation movement in East Pakistan, but there is no concrete evidence to prove its involvement. India had never nursed the dismemberment of Pakistan and to this end, she stressed on the political solution of the issue in East Pakistan within the frame-

47. Ibid., n.20. pp.43-45.

work of Pakistan. India wanted a settlement that was acceptable to the duly elected representatives of East Pakistan.⁴⁸

THE REFUGEES AND ITS PROBLEMS

Following the military crackdown on East Pakistan, thousands of refugees started pouring into India. They came to India to save their lives, again they chose India because it was the easiest country they could run to since East Pakistan was surrounded by Indian territory from three sides.

From 25 March to 16 December 1971, a total number of 9,899,305 refugees fled to India.⁴⁹ In April, 57,000 persons came to India. In May the daily influx of refugees almost doubled i.e., 102,000 a day. But in the later months the flow became less.⁵⁰

Speaking at the Sixth United Nations Committee on international law, the India's spokesman referring to the influx of refugees into India and the attending problems said: 'This could be a special type of bloodless aggression resulting from a vast incessant flow of millions of human

48. The Times of India, (New Delhi) 9 September 1971.

49. Bangladesh Documents, vol. II, (Delhi, Govt. of India) p.80.

50. Ibid., p.81.

beings who have been forced to leave their country into another'.⁵¹ The influx of refugees into India created a heavy financial burden on India. The World Bank warned India of the disastrous effect of the influx of refugees into India.⁵²

In an interview given by the military Governor of East Pakistan, General Tikka Khan had alleged that India was obstructing the return of refugees to East Pakistan. But this allegation was proved wrong by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees after his visit to the various refugee camps, he told a press conference that the allegation of General Tikka Khan has no roots.⁵³

Regarding the posting of United Nations observers in India territory, India objected to this move on political, legal and practical factors. The posting of few observers on either side of the border would not correct the present repulsive situation, India saw no justification in posting foreign personnel into its territory to prevent the massive influx, the proposed "observation" was seen as a deliberate

51. Foreign Affairs Records, External Affairs Ministry, Govt. of India, December 1971, p.345.

52. Ibid.

53. The Times of India (New Delhi) 1 July 1971.

move to bypass the Security Council with reference to the Charter of the United Nations Chapter Six, which provides, that maintenance of peace and security is the business of the Security Council for which specific modalities were specified and lastly, it was seen as a clever move to equate Pakistan with India, the victim of the civilian aggression in the form of refugees influx.⁵⁴

India made tremendous efforts to mobilise public opinion in favour of safe return of the refugees. Mrs Gandhi highlighted this in the course of her foreign tour, and all the countries she visited agreed to create an atmosphere for the return of these refugees.⁵⁵

The Pakistan Government did nothing to control the flow of refugees into India. Although, the US could realize the magnitude of the impending danger in the Sub-continent, yet it did not play any significant role to put an end to the crisis. The then US Secretary of State, Rogers stated in the General Assembly of the United Nations on 4 October 1971, that the US intended to keep aloof the events, because they were internal affairs of Pakistan.⁵⁶

54. The Statesman (New Delhi) 22 July 1971.

55. Lok Sabha Debates, vol. VIII, no 1, 15 November 1971. col. 243. Countries visited: USA, the U.K., F.R.G., France, Belgium and Australia.

56. GAOR, 26th Session, 1950th plenary meeting, 4 October 1971, para, 56, p.4.

The then President of the US Mr Richard M. Nixon, requested the Congress for an additional sum of \$ 150 million for the relief and rehabilitation of refugees from East Pakistan on humanitarian grounds. Nixon said in the Congress:

"I therefore urge, that in addition to completing action on the House initiative, the Congress authorises and appropriate an additional sum of \$ 150 million for the relief and rehabilitation of refugees from East Pakistan and for humanitarian relief in East Pakistan under the Foreign Assistance Act. Together with food supplied under Public Law 480, these funds will enable us to do our share in mitigating the effects of the human crisis and thus help avert the deepest tragedies that all easily could follow".⁵⁷ With this, one could be logically right to draw a conclusion that President Nixon had full knowledge regarding the situation in the sub-continent when he decided to favour Pakistan against India.

In an effort to solve the Bangladesh crisis, the Indian Government sent several central Ministers to various

57. Department of State Bulletin (Washington), 25 October 1971, vol. LXV, no.1687, p.445.

countries to inform them of the happenings in the region. The then Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi paid a visit to the Soviet Union and some Western European countries and the United States, Swaran Singh visited the USSR, German Democratic Republic, Canada, the US, the UK, France and the United Nations. On his return, he informed the Lok Sabha of his impression on the foreign tour on 25 June, he said that besides meeting Government authorities, he also met in every capital, legislators, editors, social workers and leaders of public opinion. In the course of his discussion, the focus of attention and emphasis was on the grave and serious situation that had been created for India by the influx of refugees from East Pakistan and the continuing crisis in the region. As a result of the discussions with these leaders, agreements were reached that, there should be no military solution of the East Pakistan problem and all military actions already in force there must be halted immediately, the flow of refugees into India must stop forthwith, conditions be created to enable all the refugees return home in peace and security, and this could only happen if the refugees were guaranteed of their future safety in their homes in East Pakistan, the only solution that could be acceptable to the people of East Pakistan was a political solution ensuring return of normalcy and lastly, the present crisis was pregnant

with serious dangers for the peace and security of the region.⁵⁸

Generally speaking this foreign tour was very helpful to India in creating world opinion in her favour and demonstrated that she was not in favour of dismembering Pakistan.

In the last week of September 1971, Mrs Gandhi visited Moscow on a three day tour. She impressed upon the Kremlin the urgency of creating conditions in East Pakistan for the return of the refugees. The Soviet Premier Kosygin called upon General Yahya Khan to make efforts in order to ease the tension in the sub-continent. The joint communique issued after the conclusion of the visit called "for an urgent solution to the problem, in keeping with the wishes, the inalienable rights and lawful interests of its people".⁵⁹

Mrs Gandhi in October 1971, conducted a tour of Western European countries, with the intentions of bringing to their notice the real happenings in the sub-continent. Secondly, she was out to know the feelings of these Western European countries leaders as to what they thought

58. Lok Sabha Debates, vol. IV, no.25, 25 June 1971
Cols. 133-4.

59. The Times of India (New Delhi) 30 September 1971.

and proposed to do in order to solve the East Pakistan issue. Thirdly, her tour enabled her to warn the West that time was running out and if nothing was done to stop Pakistan from implementing a spurious solution and to obtain the freedom of Mujibur Rehman, the war between India and Pakistan would be unavoidable.⁶⁰

On her return, Mrs Gandhi told the cabinet political Affairs Committee that she was hopeful that some world leaders would try to persuade President Yahya Khan to initiate a political settlement of the crisis and that these world leaders were now convinced of the necessity of a political settlement in East Pakistan.⁶¹ Speaking in the parliament on 15 November, she said that her tour gave her the opportunity to exchange ideas with the Heads of Governments and leaders of Public opinion. The discussions helped in removing certain misgivings and focused attention on the refusal of the Pakistan military regime to respect the verdict of their own people. The US, UK, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany assured her that no arms would be supplied to Pakistan.⁶²

60. Christiana Tirimagni Hurting, "The Indo-Pak war and the ending of a Power Balance in South Asia", Indian Journal of Political Science, vol. XXXV, no.3, July-September 1974, p.215.

61. The Statesman (New Delhi) 15 November 1971.

62. Lok Sabha Debates, vol. VIII, no 1, 15 November 1971, Cols. 242-46.

Mrs Gandhi's tour was very significant and timely on certain reasons. Firstly, it cleared the wrong impression that India was interfering in the internal affairs of Pakistan, secondly, it convinced the visited countries that war might be inevitable because of Pakistan's attitude by violating the Indian border and its army indulging in sabotage activities. Thirdly, the acceptance of the Western Countries not to send arms to Pakistan seems to indicate that these countries welcomed the Indian policy towards the liberation struggle as right and lastly, India convinced them, that she was not in favour of disintegrating Pakistan but was only out for a political solution to the crisis.

Meanwhile, there grew a widespread demand in India that she should accord to the new government of Bangladesh recognition. However, Mrs Gandhi withheld recognition.⁶³

When on 3 December 1971, Pakistan attacked India and both were engaged in war, India after careful assessment of the situation extended recognition to Bangladesh on 6 December 1971.

Explaining the causes of India's decision, Mrs Gandhi said that two developments had led to the India's decision,

63. Indian Express, (New Delhi) 8 May 1971.

one, was the victory of Awami League in the December 1970 general election, and the second was the valiant struggle of the Bangladesh people in the face of tremendous obstacles. She added that 'with the unanimous revolt of the entire people of Bangladesh and the success of their struggle, it has become increasingly apparent that the so called Mother State of Pakistan was totally incapable of bringing the people of Bangladesh back to its fold'.⁶⁴

Meanwhile, the war between India and Pakistan continued and the Indian army with the assistance of Mukti Bahini finally liberated Bangladesh on 16 December 1971.

THE INDO-SOVIET TREATY

Seeing the tension on the Indo-Pakistan borders and the Pakistan-American-China's axis threatening her before the war broke out, India signed a treaty of friendship and co-operation with the USSR on 9 August 1971 in New Delhi.⁶⁵

The immediate objective of the treaty was to defend India's territorial integrity and the preservation of world peace which was threatened by the US, Pakistan and China.⁶⁶ The treaty contained twelve articles. It reaffirmed that India's policy of non-alignment being the corner stone

64. Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi, publication Div., Ministry of information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India (New Delhi, 1975) p.593.

65. The Statesman (New Delhi) 10 August 1971.

66. Das Tapan, Two Years of Indo-Soviet Treaty (Delhi, 1973) pp.6-7.

of India foreign policy had constituted an important factor in the maintenance of international peace and in reducing tension in the world. Four articles stressed the objective of world peace and cooperation. Other articles talked about the economic, cultural and scientific relations between the two countries.

Articles eight and nine⁶⁷ were the most important articles of the treaty in light of the 1971 crisis, these articles made it clear by implication that should China attempt to intervene in an Indo-Pakistan War, the USSR would do all within its power to handle the situation. Further, the issue of right or wrong would have no bearing as far as it is in connection with the help to India from the USSR, so long as India was against China.⁶⁸

Commenting on the treaty, the Indian express, said that the treaty was a response "to the developing situation in the India sub-continent".⁶⁹

Jana Sangh a major opposition party of India was in doubt as to whether India would be able to take action in East Pakistan.⁷⁰

67. Survival, XIII October 1971, pp.351-3.

68. Shah Zafar, M.A., India and the Super Powers (New Delhi, 1983), p.55.

69. Indian Express, Indo-Soviet Treaty 10 August 1971.

70. The Times of India, (New Delhi) 10 August 1971. A.B. Vajpayee expressed this doubt.

The Hindustan Times in its editorial under the caption "Was it necessary" remarked on 10 August that there was "absolutely no doubt that in entering into a Security arrangement with one of the world's super powers, India had abandoned non-alignment" and had "aligned itself with the Soviet bloc".⁷¹ Morarji Desai of the Congress (O) also took a critical view of the treaty and said that like all treaties between a strong and a weak power, it would help mainly the Soviet Union.⁷² It was held by many that under the existing international situation, the Soviet backing could have been secured by India without paying the price of a treaty for twenty years. This popular view was expressed clearly in an editorial which wrote: "The Soviet Veto in the Security Council and Soviet aid in a crisis could surely have been ensured without the cost of so comprehensive a treaty".⁷³ In the Lok Sabha, Swaran Singh the then External Affairs Minister, told the members on 10 August 1971 that the treaty did not debar India from taking any unilateral action on Bangladesh.⁷⁴

Thus, though the popular reaction to the Indo-Soviet treaty was mixed, the dominant trend of the Indian public was not in its favour. The main charge against the treaty

71. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 10 August 1971.

72. The Motherland 23 August 1971.

73. The Statesman (New Delhi) 10 August 1971.

74. Lok Sabha Debates, vol. VII, no 57, 10 August 1971, Cols. 330-43.

was, that instead of strengthening the freedom movement of Bangladesh, it would impose limitations upon India's freedom of action. It was assumed that the Soviet Union was still committed to a policy of maintaining friendly relations with both India and Pakistan, and that she might favour only a Tashkent type of settlement as the solution of the crisis. The persistent Soviet appeals for a solution in the interests of the "entire" people of Pakistan and the cause of peace in the region seemed to have confirmed this suspicion.⁷⁵

The reaction in Pakistan was adverse. The official reaction of Pakistan could be judged from the statement of its Ambassador to the United States Agha Shahi, who in a television interview expressed the concern that India might use the treaty to "attack Pakistan". He was convinced that the treaty was a mutual defence pact and the USSR would actively help India militarily in case of a war with Pakistan.⁷⁶

Communist China, disliked the treaty. A spokesman of the seven-member trade delegation of China after its conclusion of a seven day visit to Guyana said that China

75. Ghosh, S. The Role of India in the emergence of Bangladesh (Calcutta, 1983), p.172.

76. The Hindu (Madras) 17 August 1971.

certainly did not regard the treaty as a friendly act as far as it was concerned.⁷⁷

It was rightly pointed out in an editorial of the New York Times that though the treaty was made primarily to deter Pakistan against any attack on India with the Chinese support, it might make India "bolder" in her "Support for Bengali liberation army and thus increase the danger of Indo-Pakistan clashes that could get out of hands". The paper doubted whether the treaty could promote peace in the area and wrote that the Kremlin could no longer play the role of a mediator which it did after the war of 1965 at Tashkent. By signing this treaty with India, Moscow, it observed had "compromised any credit it still may have had in Islamabad."⁷⁸

The Indo-Soviet treaty was a product of two important developments in the international arena - One global and the other regional. India was mainly concerned with the latter while the Soviet Union with both. Though China had hostile relations with both Moscow and New Delhi, the growing Sino-US rapprochement was not directed primarily against India, nor was it conceived against the backdrop

77. Ibid., 4 October 1971.

78. The New York Times, (editorial) "Major Foreign Policy Coup", 10 August 1971.

of the developments in the sub-continent. It was the Moscow's interest which was being directly threatened by it. China's foreign policy was guided basically by its dispute with Moscow and the Sino-US accord would also provide the US with a bargaining leverage over the Soviets. By that time, it was largely believed in India that the country's interests would be better served by holding on to the policy of non-alignment in these moves and counter-moves of big powers politics. In spite of China's hostility, India did not rule out the chances of normalizing its relations with Peking. The Sino-Soviet Schism was, however, more fundamental and deeprooted and it took the form of a new cold war. The Indian elites were almost unanimous in holding that their conflict with China should in no way be linked with the Sino-Soviet dispute and it was apprehended by many in India that a general and long term treaty with the USSR might ultimately reduce India to the position of a junior partner in Moscow's policy of containing China. The Chinese and the American support to Yahya Khan created serious problems for India, and the USSR was also interested in eliminating their influence from the sub-continent as far as possible. Though the objectives of both Moscow and New Delhi synchronized in this respect, the Kremlin looked at the problem from the point of its global strategy, whereas India's involvement was limited. Threatened with isolation

by the Sino-US accord, the Soviet Union sought friendship with the second largest country of Asia and afraid of Sino-US intervention in favour of Pakistan on the Bangladesh issue, India was eager to conclude a treaty with Russia. The interests of both the countries requires an alliance - the Indian interest needed it on a short-term basis and the Soviet interest demanded a treaty of long duration. The Indian reaction to this treaty should be understood in the light of this convergence as well as divergence in the interests of the two countries.⁷⁹

79. Ghosh, S., n.75, pp.167-168.

CHAPTER-III

THE U.S.A. AND BANGLADESH

The American grand design in the post-war period which focused on the structure of super power relationships, shaped the US role in the Bangladesh crisis. Its foreign policy is thus derived not in reference to a given country, but to one or more world powers. The US foreign policy of containment has been its basic strategy in South Asia and so has been quite firm with its allies, ruthless and even brutal with its foes, and both scornful and stern towards neutrals.¹

The US policy towards the Bangladesh crisis should therefore, be seen from the US global strategy aimed at its national interest in South Asia.

The crisis in Pakistan for an end to military rule and restoration of democracy, which forced Yahya Khan to order for elections in December 1970 and saw the victory of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and his Awami League party. But this victory was an insult to the military junta of West Pakistan and so it embarked on a campaign to liquidate the people of East Pakistan by organizing mass murder, rape, destruction and extermination against the Bengalis towards the end of March 1971.²

1. Misra, K.P., (ed.) Foreign Policy of India (New Delhi, 1977) p.276.

2. Vibhakar, J., A Model Relationship, 25 years of Indo-Soviet Diplomatic ties (New Delhi, 1972) p.50.

AMERICAN'S ROLE IN THE BANGLADESH CRISIS

As soon as the crisis erupted, the US adopted an anti-Indian and pro-Pakistan attitude till the end of the crisis that witnessed the birth of independent Bangladesh.

The Nixon administration's anti-Indian stand emanates from the conviction of the administration that India was to annex Bangladesh, secondly, India would carry the war to the West and annex large area of West Pakistan, thirdly, that the Soviet Union was working in collaboration with India to establish military and naval bases in India.³ These beliefs were against the American professions of maintaining peace in the sub-continent. Fourthly, the American strategists held that, Islamabad regime presented a link to encircle the Soviet Union and China. In an effort to stop the Islamabad regime from going into the hands of China, the American government therefore, had to continue the supply of military equipments to Pakistan.⁴

Nixon's personal interest was also at play in being good to Pakistan. This was to reward President Yahya Khan's efforts in arranging Nixon's visit to China.⁵ The use of

3. The Statesman (New Delhi) 30 December 1971.

4. Ibid.

5. Homer, A. Jack, "US, India and Bangladesh", Motherland, 6 September 1971.

Pakistan airbase of Peshawar in May for the flight of U2 which went on a spy mission over the Soviet Union was still very fresh in the mind of President Nixon.

Numerous other reasons for Nixon's anti-India and pro-Pakistani attitude could be cited. Nixon hated the policy of non-alignment of Jawahar Lal Nehru, he condemned the non-aligned policy as far back as 1954, when he was reported to have felt inclined 'to favour military aid to Pakistan as a counter force to the India's policy of non-alignment'.⁶ Nixon stuck to his guns even when the arming of Pakistan had proved disastrous to the entire sub-continent.⁷

Furthermore, the cold reception accorded to Nixon in 1969 when he visited India as an ex-Vice President of the US seems to have added to his anti-India stand.⁸ When he visited India, no body in the Indian government took notice of his visit. On the other hand, his visit to Pakistan was markedly different. He was warmly received. The military regime under Ayub Khan, arranged a banquet and also a police tattoo in his honour.⁹ This never faded

6. Kulkarni, V.B., "Mr Nixon's indophobia", Indian Express, 12 January 1972.

7. The Times of India (New Delhi) 9 December 1971).

8. Ibid., 18 December 1971.

9. The Statesman (New Delhi) 13 December 1971.

from his mind and so could always find a reason to oppose India both on national and international issues.¹⁰

Then came the signing of the Indo-Soviet friendship and cooperation treaty on 9 August 1971. The US was not amused with the growing Indo-Soviet relations.¹¹

Another explanation for Nixon's pro-Pakistan attitude, was that he did not want Pakistan to be dismembered, because it had always supported the United States on various international issues be it in or out of the United Nations, although not on all issues. India on the other hand, had on many occasions clashed with the US on a number of international issues.

Perhaps, the Indo-Soviet treaty hardened Nixon's attitude towards the Bangladesh crisis, as Nixon feared that the Soviet Union's influence in the sub-continent would certainly increase if India succeeded in dismembering Pakistan,¹² and the US would be pushed to the background.

Kissinger had in his White House years, tried to justify Nixon's tilt towards Pakistan on the grounds among others,

10. Ibid.

11. Ram Raghu Nath, Super Powers and Indo-Pakistani Sub-continent, Perceptives and Policies, (New Delhi, 1985), p.300.

12. Ibid., pp.312-3.

were, his dislike for Mrs Gandhi's personality, his desire to exploit Sino-Soviet differences, and his ambition to make America the dominant power in the world by propping up aligned states like Pakistan and opposing independent non-aligned states like India.¹³ One more allegation levelled against India by Nixon's administration was that India had an assurance from the USSR to intervene, should either the US or China intervene in the sub-continent. But Mrs Gandhi denied this allegation.¹⁴

Analysing the motives of President Nixon, an American journalist, C.L. Schulzberger, said that each of the two countries of the sub-continent - India and Pakistan - was aligning itself with one or the other communist power. India had gone under the influence of Russia and Pakistan under the Chinese. Nixon had to favour one of the two groups, he could not stand neutral. Neutrality, would have cost the US influence in both India and Pakistan.

Schulzberger remarked:

'A pro-India posture would have abandoned any role in Pakistan, damaging improved relations with China, and

13. Kaul, T.N., The Kissinger Years, Indo-American Relations (New Delhi, 1980) pp.33-34.

14. The Hindu (Madras) 9 January 1972.

still leave Uncle Sam second fiddle in India. A pro-Pakistani posture would have destroyed the remnants of our position in India, perhaps recapturing some role in Pakistan, but certainly would improve chances of Nixon's Project to gain friendship in Peking'.¹⁵

Nixon chose the latter option and stuck to it till the end. His aim was to get closer to China and for that he could not bother to offend India. He believed that improved relations with China would enable him tilt the balance of world power in the United States' favour and he considered this to be a major foreign policy objective which would serve his personal political fortune right.¹⁶ And since China had good relations with Pakistan and not with India, Nixon certainly would do nothing which could go counter to China's wishes and likes.

With this anti-India attitude of Nixon, India feared the chances of the Nixon administration being tempted to convert the Bangladesh crisis into a second Vietnam.¹⁷ This fear was truly reflected in the US Congress blocking all aid to Pakistan and loud criticism given out by the press.¹⁸

15. Schulzberger, C.L., "Why Nixon chose to be pro-Pakistan", The Hindu (Madras) 12 January 1972.

16. Ibid., 9 January 1972.

17. The Motherland, 24 August 1971.

18. The New York Times, 14 July 1971.

The warm reception accorded by India to some American visitors who were politically opposed to Nixon like Senator Kennedy added to Nixon's hatred for India.¹⁹

The supply of military equipment worth about \$ 3 million by the US to Pakistan was protested against. Kissinger objected to what he termed propaganda launched by India in this regard.²⁰ However, Nixon told Mrs Gandhi in Washington during her tour not to be unduly bothered about American military supplies to Pakistan which were only marginal and which in any case, were later stopped.²¹

The US administration blamed India and complained that India had escalated the war by taking military action on 22 November 1971 at a time when there was a minor skirmish between the troops of India and Pakistan on the Bengal border.²² India, however, denied this allegation as she claimed that the three Pakistani jets were in the Indian territory to strafe an Indian town, Agartala.

A White House spokesman said that the war obstructed the secret negotiations undertaken by the US which had

19. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 18 December 1971.

20. The Patriot, 26 December 1971, US rushed arms to Pakistan five days before conflict.

21. Sharma, R., Bangladesh Crisis and Indian foreign Policy, (New Delhi, 1978), p.220.

22. Gupta, V., Anderson Papers - A Study of Nixon Blackmail of India (Delhi, 1972), p.51.

achieved a great deal of success before it was terminated by the war.²³

This allegation was completely fictitious as even the Soviet Union alleged that it had no knowledge and no evidence of any sort, proving that Yahya Khan was making such a move for a political settlement. The Soviets maintained that it was the US backing to Yahya Khan that was complicating the situation and finally led to the pre-emptive attack on India.²⁴

The refusal to withdraw troops by India was not liked by Washington. India refused to honour the proposal on the ground that Pakistan's military bases lay close to the border while India's were far away.²⁵

President Nixon at one stage wrote to inform Mrs Gandhi, that Yahya Khan was willing to troops withdrawal unilaterally in an effort to lessen the tense border situation.²⁶ However, no clarification was visible whether Nixon's proposal was to withdrawal of troops from the western or both western and eastern borders. India's stand was that

23. The Statesman (New Delhi) 9 December 1971.

24. Sharma, R., n.21, p.221.

25. Ibid.

26. Amrit Bazar Patrika (Calcutta) 2 December 1971.

withdrawal should start with Pakistan withdrawing troops from East Pakistan. This would certainly portray a big gesture of peace on the part of Pakistan to solve the Bangladesh crisis.²⁷ India's refusal to withdraw its troops had three major advantages, from the military point of view, if once withdrawn, restoration would take a longer time as compared to the time Pakistan would take in doing same.


Secondly, it prevented Pakistan government from committing more atrocities and thereby helped the Mukti Bahini and thirdly, it stopped the influx of refugees into India.²⁸

It is clear that the US practically did nothing by way of influencing Pakistan to seek a political settlement in Bangladesh. The US said nothing about the heinous crimes such as mass rape, looting and other atrocities committed by the Pakistan army. It was very unkind for certain quarters close to Nixon to have claimed that an additional ten million people to India's five hundred million population would make no difference and that India with time would be able to absorb them.²⁹

27. Ibid.

28. The Times of India (New Delhi) 27 November 1971, (edit).
Uncalled for advice.

29. Indian Express (New Delhi) 30 November 1971.



Certain sources in America argued that India was refusing to permit the refugees to return because it was gaining from the international aid that the refugees brought. This was totally mischievous, the truth, was that for nine million refugees, India had to spend Rupees seven hundred crores a year or nine hundred and ninety three million dollars. The international aid that was provided to India upto 30 September was one hundred and fourteen million dollars in which the US contributed most with seventy million dollars.³⁰ The US also offered certain commodities such as rice, sugar and edible oils.

However, the US assistance to India for maintaining the refugees was, therefore considered by India as "woefully inadequate and addressed to the symptom rather than the cause of the trouble."³¹

During the crisis, the US made an effort to befriend the Bangladesh leaders in Calcutta and persuaded them to take 'a more realistic view of their tragic tangle with West Pakistan so that the Big Powers could extend a helping hand to them in bringing about a reasonable political

30. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 29 October 1971.

31. Barnds, William. J., India, Pakistan and the Great Powers, (London, 1972), p.247.

settlement between the East and West Pakistan. India viewed this as criminal intentions as it was meant to bale out the West Pakistanis from a critical spot without meeting the genuine needs of the East Pakistanis.

The US frowned at the decision of the Bangladesh government to send a delegation to the UN to plead their case. The US representatives at the UN avoided meeting the Bangladesh delegates. Still out to browbeat the Bangladesh leaders into submission, the leaders of Bangladesh were told that the safety of Mujibur Rehman could not be guaranteed not until they agreed to reach a settlement with Yahya's regime. The offer of a confederation or loose federation of both wings of Pakistan was also made all in a bid to make them go with the US.³²

Nixon is also reported to have threatened Moscow that he would cancel his proposed visit to Moscow in May 1972, should it stick to its approach in the Indo-Pakistan crisis.³³

Before the outbreak of the war, the US had supplied substantial quantities of arms on urgent request to Pakistan

32. Sharma, R., n.21, pp.229-30.

33. Daily Telegraph (London) 21 December 1971.

by C-141 Cargo planes, which were found offloading arms in Karachi at 10.30 pm on 29 November 1971.³⁴ The US administration accepted loading the planes but denied having offloaded the arms. The US government claimed that it had made all efforts to bring about a political settlement of the crisis and held India as "unreasonable and recalcitrant nation" but absolved Pakistan of the responsibility for the war. The State Department in Washington held India as "an aggressor" and the economic aid programme for India was put under review. Nixon on his part, publicly supported Pakistan action in East Pakistan and held India responsible for the consequences and asked Dr. Kissinger to take a tough stance towards India.³⁵

As soon as the war broke out on 3 December 1971, President Nixon lifted the military embargo placed on Pakistan. This came to the notice of the then American Ambassador Kenneth B. Keating in New Delhi by General Manekshaw. In a classified telegram to the State Department, Keating had stated:

"I consider General Manekshaw one of the most honest and straight forward Indian I have ever met. I have

34. Gupta, V., n.22, pp. 19-20.

35. Kunhi Krishna, T.V., The Unfriendly Friends, India and America (New Delhi, 1974) pp.101-2.

no doubt that Manekshaw honestly believes what he reported. If true, this information is indirect violation of publicly announced policy".³⁶ During the war, the US arms continued to be delivered to Pakistan through third countries.³⁷

The arms deliveries were made on the authorization of the White House. In this connection, the US Ambassador in Jordan is reported to have sent a cable regarding King Hussain's request for the transfer of aircrafts to Pakistan. According to White House papers, Kissinger stated:

The President may want to honour these requests. The matter has not been brought to the Presidential attention, but it is quite obvious that the President is not inclined to let the Pakistanis be defeated.³⁸

The authorization to supply arms by Jordan to Pakistan was issued on 7 December and jets reached Pakistan on 10 December. And the same day, the Nixon's administration instructed Turkish pilots in Libya to be prepared to fly planes to Rawalpindi. These pilots were in Libya on training mission. Under Nixon's plan, they were to go to Saudi Arabia and Turkey to take American fighters and bombers to Pakistan.³⁹

36. Gupta, V., n.22, pp.19-20.

37. Ibid., pp.141-3.

38. Ibid., p.142.

39. The Times of India (New Delhi) 7 January 1972.

This was done disregarding the sanction of the Congress and the assurances to India. The US authorized Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey to supply arms to Pakistan and assured these pro-American countries of replacements in lieu of supplies made to Pakistan.⁴⁰

Kissinger while in New Delhi on 6 July, talking about the arms deal admitted that there was some 'bureaucratic muddle' in the implementation of Washington's 25 March arms ban policy and that the irregularities were being rectified.⁴¹ This was not convincing, because if the US was sincere nothing prevented it from stopping further supply of arms to Pakistan.

On 7 July, Kissinger while in Pakistan made an announcement, that the US had assured Pakistan that it would not interfere with four or five more ship loads of military spare parts and ammunition purchased by Pakistan in the US under valid licences and still scheduled to arrive.⁴² When the US officials attention was drawn to this announcement, they said that the policy of providing limited amounts of aid for relief projects and allowing arms shipments had given the US an opportunity to hold a 'private dialogue'

40. Gupta, V., n.22, p.143.

41. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 7 July 1971.

42. Ibid., 8 July 1971.

with the Pakistani military regime in a bid to find a solution to the East Pakistan crisis.⁴³

Senator Kennedy criticized the US government for having offered military equipment to the tune of about nine million dollars to Pakistan ignoring an administrative moratorium on arms shipments.⁴⁴

Throughout the crisis, the US did not issue a single statement disapproving Islamabad's repressive actions in East Pakistan.

The US Consul-General in Dacca sent series of cables to Washington, urging it to denounce the Pakistan repressive actions there. The US Ambassador in New Delhi, Kenneth B. Keating also told the US that he was "deeply shocked at the massacre" and was "greatly concerned at the US vulnerability to damaging association with a reign of military terror". He urged the US to deplore "this brutality" promptly, publicly and prominently and suspend all military deliveries to Pakistan. President Nixon got offended and found it "courageous" that his diplomats should send "petitions rather than reports". He ordered his transfer from Dacca.

43. The Statesman (New Delhi) 13 January 1972.

44. Ibid., 6 October 1971.

He chided Keating for allowing himself to be "taken over by the Indians"⁴⁵ Nixon blamed India and accused her of creating the crisis, on the other hand, he praised Pakistan for internationalizing the relief efforts in East Pakistan; for the replacement of the military Governor in East Pakistan by a civilian; for the setting of a time table for return to full civilian rule; for the proclamation of a general amnesty covering all people not charged with specific criminal acts; for the promise not to execute Mujibur Rehman; for its agreement to unilateral withdrawal of Pakistani forces from the borders; for Yahya Khan's willingness to talk to the leaders of the Bangladesh Government in exile and for the acceptance of the good offices of the UN observers on both sides of the border⁴⁶. He again criticized India for withholding its co-operation from Pakistan, the US and the UN.⁴⁷

While in Washington in June 1971, the then Indian External Affairs Minister, Swaran Singh appealed to President Nixon and the then Secretary of State William Rogers to persuade Pakistan to find a political solution to the crisis. He also urged them to suspend economic and

45. Kissinger, A.H., The White House Years (New Delhi, 1979) pp. 853-4.

46. US Foreign policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace. A Report to the Congress by Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, 9 February 1972, (Washington, D.C., 1972) p.49.

47. Ibid., p.146.

military aid to Pakistan.⁴⁸ The US leaders expressed concern over the refugees problem that was facing India and assured Swaran Singh that no further shipments of arms would be made to Pakistan. But even when Swaran Singh was still in the US, a ship loaded with arms left New York harbour for Pakistan. Economic aid to Pakistan continued. This US action provoked indignation of members of Lok Sabha in India and their friendly posture towards the US suffered a setback.

Swaran Singh, disclosed the fact of Senator Church's statement, in which it was officially admitted that thirty five million dollars worth of equipment were actually sent to Pakistan.⁴⁹

Senator Church criticizing the US attitude remarked: "We say in Vietnam that we are fighting for self-determination so that the people there can have the opportunity to choose their own government. Yet in Pakistan we continue to give support to an authoritarian clique that conduct business by Martial Law and forcibly deprives its own citizens of the right of self-determination even after a free and fair election."⁵⁰

48. Kissinger, A.H., n.45, p.858.

49. Lok Sabha Debates, vol. V, no.36, 2 July 1971.

50. Congressional Records, 92nd Congress, 1st session, vol. 107, pt. 18, Wednesday 17, July 1971, p.24036.

Nixon reportedly warned India on 31 July that should it intervene in East Pakistan, it would pay very dearly for it.⁵¹ Kissinger also issued a warning to the Indian Ambassador in the US L.K. Jha, saying that if India continued to foment trouble for Pakistan in East Pakistan and if China comes to Pakistan's aid, India "must not expect any help from the US".⁵² Columnist Tom Braden disclosed that on 12 October, Ambassador Kenneth B. Keating conveyed the US warning to the Indian government that should India fail to desist from its help to the insurgents in East Pakistan, Pakistan would attack her from the West.⁵³ Nixon also despatched a letter to Mrs Gandhi, though it remains a secret document but certain well-informed American Press carried reports alleging that Nixon had warned Mrs Gandhi that America would directly intervene in the Indo-Pakistan war since there was a mutual defence pact between the US and Pakistan. Mrs Gandhi in a subsequent speech said in Delhi, though not mentioning any country, that threats were being given to India and certain pacts with Pakistan were being mentioned.⁵⁴ Mrs Gandhi added that our understanding of these pacts was that they were directed towards the containment of communism and not to arm the government concerned to suppress the people. This clearly brought home

51. The Times of India (New Delhi) 1 August, 1971.

52. The Times (London), 23 August 1971.

53. Krishan Bhati "About Some Leaks", The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 12 January 1972.

54. Indian Express (New Delhi) 21 December 1971.

to Indians that she was referring to the threats by the US fortunately, good sense prevailed and Nixon never took such action, otherwise it should have been hell fire and beyond imagination for the US. The US even shamelessly propagated that what was happening in East Pakistan was a secessionist movement and should be crushed as such, but this never convinced anybody in his right frame of mind.⁵⁵

India was also threatened by the US Secretary of State regarding the prospects of stopping American assistance to her. Meanwhile, Mrs Gandhi visited the US, the UK, Belgium, Austria, France and the Federal Republic of Germany in October - November 1971, her mission was to inform the leaders of these countries of the realities of the East Pakistan problem, while speaking at a dinner in Washington, she said: Today some countries want to support the prestige of one man, they are threatening peace in the entire sub-continent. I do not personally think that they can save Pakistan or keep it united or keep it strong by supporting a person who is not an elected person, who is a military dictator.⁵⁶ Here she was referring to the US and China. She made it clear that the refugees problem was too heavy a

55. Sharma, R., n.21, pp.230-31.

56. Govt. of India Ministry of information & Broadcasting Publi. Div., "India Speaks", (New Delhi, 1971), p.11.

burden for India and that something needed to be done before things went off hands. Nixon in his reply, enumerated the gains the US had achieved through negotiations with the Government of Pakistan and the leaders of the Awami League party. He assured Mrs Gandhi that the "outcome was bound to be autonomy for East Pakistan leading to independence". He asked India to complete her round of negotiations with Pakistan and the Bengali leaders.⁵⁷ Mrs Gandhi's visit to the US thus became a failure, as Nixon stuck to his guns.

On 6 December 1971, Washington suspended \$ 87.6 million dollars aid to India which was in the pipeline.⁵⁸

An official of the US government remarked that: 'In conditions of war it is patently impossible for a country to carry on any sort of development programme'. But the real motive behind the suspension of aid to India was to make sure that such help never went into India's hands to carry on with the war.⁵⁹ However, this did not detract India from the pursuit of her national policies.

CHINA'S ROLE

The Chinese, more than any other people, were, from the very start, deeply involved in the Bangladesh crisis.

57. Kissinger, A.H., n.45, p.881.

58. The Times of India (New Delhi) 7 December 1971.

59. The Statesman (New Delhi) 8 December 1971.

The crisis was of much concern to the Chinese government, which for most of the sixties had nursed a steadily growing friendship with Pakistan. A Pakistani author felt that China opposed the creation of Bangladesh as an independent state, under the influence of the Soviet Union, because in her opinion, the Soviet influence would weaken her security on her Western and Southern frontiers.⁶⁰ Both US and China seem to have co-operated during the Indo-Pakistan war. C.L. Schulzberger, the New York Times columnist wrote that there was a movement of Chinese troops along its frontier with India while the US sent the Seventh Fleet to Bay of Bengal. He added: "both China and the US working with rare harmony made bluff manoeuvres against India's land and sea frontiers". He said the US and China "found themselves virtually co-belligerents when they backed Pakistan" - this marked dramatic departure from the traditional US policy which although allied to Pakistan had sought to build up India as an Asiatic counterpoise to China. Senator Kennedy linked the US stand on the Indo-Pakistan war with the normalisation of relations with China.⁶¹

Almost immediately after the junta's crackdown on East Pakistan, Zhou Enlai, in his letter of 12 April to General Yahya Khan, praised the junta for its actions

60. Bindra, S.S., Indo-Pak Relations, (New Delhi, 1981) p.187.

61. Ibid.

designed to prevent the dismemberment of Pakistan and to preserve its integrity. He, as a friend of Pakistan, advised Yahya Khan to isolate the handful of persons, who were out to "Sabotage the unity of Pakistan". Concluding his letter, he wrote: Your Excellency may rest assured that, should the Indian expansionists dare to launch aggression against Pakistan, the Chinese government and people will, as always, firmly support the Pakistan government and people in their just struggle to safeguard state sovereignty and national independence". The Christian Science Monitor said it was ironical that China supported Pakistan. This support according to the newspaper, could only be explained from the standpoint of a position of strength policy, and not of ideology. Beijing denounced the national liberation movement and sided with the authoritarian leadership of President Yahya Khan.⁶² And so there was no humanitarian aspect in China's reaction - no criticism of Islamabad's action, no sympathy for India on account of the refugee burden and no contribution for any relief purpose. According to China, India engineered the problem and a refugee problem was created by India's intransigence.⁶³

62. Cited in Chaudhuri Sailen, Beijing - Washington - Islamabad entente, Genesis and Development (New Delhi, 1982), p.64.

63. Ghosh Sucheta, The Role of India in the Emergence of Bangladesh (Calcutta 1983) p.182.

The Chinese support for Pakistan and her hostile attitude towards India was directly and unequivocally indicated in an article published in the Jen-Minh Jih-Pao on 11 April 1971.⁶⁴ The following points were raised by the article. First, the political developments in East Pakistan were internal affairs of Pakistan and they did not constitute any threat to India's security; Secondly, India, taking advantage of Pakistan's internal difficulties, started interfering in her domestic affairs which gave rise to a great security problem for Pakistan; thirdly, the two super powers, particularly the USSR, working in close alliance with India, had also adopted a policy of 'crude' interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan, and finally, China would support Pakistan against all foreign intervention and aggression.

On 5 July 1971, 250 Chinese army personnel arrived in East Pakistan to help the Martial Law Administration to restore communications and train Pakistani soldiers in anti-guerilla warfare. An ordnance factory was built with China's aid near Dacca. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman told an annual Congress of the Bangladesh Students' Union on 9 April 1972, 80 per cent of arms captured from Pakistani troops were marked "Made in China" and the rest "Made in USA".⁶⁵

64. Survey of China Mainland Press, no.4882, 22 April 1971, pp.109-110. Cited in *ibid.*, p.182-183.

65. Chaudhuri, Sailen, n.62, p.63.

A hundred lorries a day were reportedly used for military supplies by China to Pakistan in its Ordnance depots in Peshawar and Rawalpindi.⁶⁶ It was also Chinese's help that it permitted Pakistan with all facilities to send military aircraft to the East over their territory.⁶⁷

The shipment of Chinese arms and ammunition in about 100 crates were also a sign of China's help. India was aware of these aid.⁶⁸

Along with military aid, there was an increasing flow of Chinese economic assistance to Pakistan during the crisis. Peking was reported to have given the Karachi branch and the Chittagong sub-branch of the Bank of China as gifts to Pakistan government.⁶⁹ Still supporting Pakistan, China denounced the Indo-Soviet collusion and accused Moscow of supporting India with "Military provocation" and "Subversive activities" towards Pakistan.⁷⁰

Pakistan got all the verbal and moral support it needed from China. Beyond oral excesses, China did not move. In the opinion of a Pakistan writer, the major factor that

66. The Daily Telegraph, 28 April 1971.

67. The Times of India, (New Delhi), 29 January 1972.

68. The Statesman (New Delhi), 1 June 1971.

69. Ghosh Sucheta, n.63, p.187.

70. Bindra, S.S., n.60, pp.187-188.

restrained her was the Indo-Soviet Treaty.⁷¹ In the UN, China also lashed out at India and the USSR.⁷²

IN THE UNITED NATIONS

At the request of the US Ambassador to the UN, George Bush, the Bangladesh issue was brought to the Security Council on 4 December 1971. The US-sponsored resolution in the Security Council held India responsible for the outbreak of the India-Pakistan war. The main aim of the move was to sidetrack the basic issues before the UN General Assembly, and the USSR vetoed the resolution which called for immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani troops to their respective sides of the Indo-Pakistani borders.⁷³ Almost a similar resolution was introduced the following day and again the USSR vetoed it, while Britain and France abstained. Thus, the USSR's negative vote (Veto) blocked the resolution and so nothing came out of it.

The Soviet Ambassador to the UN, Jacob Malik described the US resolution as "a one sided and unacceptable draft". He further said that the US approach was to "shift responsibility from the right to wrong". He also criticized China,

71. Ibid., p.188.

72. Ibid.

73. SCOR, S/PV.1606, 4 December 1971, p.91.

though not naming her for the position it had taken in the crisis.⁷⁴ China had also attacked the USSR and India by saying that India's attack was launched under the support of "Social imperialism" and described the crisis as "purely an internal affair of Pakistan".⁷⁵

The same resolution was moved on 7 December 1971, in the General Assembly and was adopted as it was favoured by 104 votes to 11, with 10 absentions.⁷⁶

The Indian Government refused to implement the resolution, because she felt that it was unrealistic to do so, without giving a hearing to the representatives of Bangladesh who were directly the victims of West Pakistani army brutality.⁷⁷

Pakistan, however, accepted to implement the resolution.⁷⁸

Speaking in the Security Council on the same day, George Bush praised Pakistan for its acceptance of the

74. For the text of the speech see, Ibid., pp.116-137.

75. Ibid., p.106-7.

76. A/RES/2793, 7 December 1971.

77. A/8580 and S/10445, 12 December 1971.

78. A/8567 and S/10440, 9 December 1971.

resolution and held India responsible for the "broadening" of the crisis.⁷⁹

The US once again raised the issue in the Security Council on 14 December, calling for an immediate Indo-Pakistani cease-fire and troops withdrawal of both sides. However, the USSR again used its veto to block the US resolution. Mr Jacob Malik said that the US resolution contained the "old approach" which tried to commit the council to a wrong and unrealistic course.⁸⁰

However, the Council could only adopt a resolution on 21 December which demanded that a durable cease-fire and cessation of all hostilities in all areas of conflict be strictly observed and remain in effect until the withdrawals took place.⁸¹

Before the adoption of this resolution, the war between India and Pakistan had ended, heralding the birth of independent Bangladesh.

WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTION GROUP

As soon as the Indo-Pakistan war broke out, the Washington Special Action Group met several times to assess

79. Department of State Bulletin, 27 December 1971, pp.727-8.

80. Vibhakhar, J., n.2., pp.61-62.

81. S/RES/307, 21 December 1971.

the war situation and to provide the required support both morally and military to Pakistan. The meetings revealed America's 'tilt' towards Pakistan and Nixon's assistance during the War.

In the meeting of 3 December 1971, Dr Kissinger had said: "I am getting hell every half hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India. He has just called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favour of Pakistan. He feels everything we do comes out otherwise".⁸²

The Washington Special Action Group was engaged almost everyday reviewing the war in their various secret meetings in the White House. The result of this conspiracy between President Nixon and the WSAG favoured US 'tilt' towards Pakistan and this 'tilt' explains the attitude of George Bush in the Security Council. But the US failed to achieve its aim because of the Soviet Veto. George Bush, the American's Ambassador to the UN, in the course of explaining the draft resolution held India responsible for the crisis in East Pakistan when in the Security Council he said: "... , but since the beginning of the crisis it should be

82. Rahamathulla, B., Indo-American Politics 1970-78, (New Delhi, 1980), p.46.

be clear that India bears the major responsibility for broadening the crisis..."⁸³ Senator Church who could not understand why America should 'tilt' towards Pakistan remarked that: "I find it odd to understand why there is such a pro-Pakistani bias in American policies. India's position in the war which has now broken out is not only consistent with her professed ideals but it is also the position which is most likely to prevail..."⁸⁴

SEVENTH FLEET DEPLORED

Having failed to compel India to end its military operations against Pakistan, Nixon on 9 December 1971, ordered the "task force" of the Seventh Fleet, led by nuclear - powered aircraft carrier enterprise to proceed to Bay of Bengal. Nixon's aim was to bolster the sagging morale of the Pakistani troops and to intimidate India. The official excuse advanced by the US for sending the Seventh Fleet was the evacuation of 300 Americans in Bangladesh. However, this was a lame excuse, because a Fleet was not necessary to carry out this task.⁸⁵

According to Anderson, "the evacuation of America citizens was strictly a secondary mission, adopted more as

83. GAOR, 26th Session, 2002nd Plenary meeting, 7 December 1971, para 96, p.10.

84. SCOR, 26th Year, 1608th meeting 6 December 1971, para 78, p.9.

85. Chaudhuri, Sailen, p.62, p.73.

a justification than the reason for the naval move". He was convinced that the mission was a part of America design meant to scare India.⁸⁶

According to Anderson, the American motive behind moving this "task force" was four-fold; To compel India to divert both ships and war-planes to shadow the task force; to weaken India's blockade against East Pakistan; to divert the Indian aircraft carrier Vikrant from its mission and to force India to keep its own war-planes on defence alert, thus reducing their operations against the Pakistani ground force⁸⁷. However, the task force proved useless as it was still 30 hours sailing away when the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan surrendered to the joint command of Indian army and Mukti Bahini on 16 December 1971 in Dacca. India declared a unilateral cease-fire on the Western front which Pakistan accepted.

Announcing the victory of the Indian army to the members of the Lok Sabha, Mrs Gandhi said: "... The West Pakistan forces have unconditionally surrendered in Bangladesh..." She continued "Our objectives were limited

86. Indian Express (New Delhi) 15 December 1971.

87. The International Herald Tribune (Paris) 3 January 1972.

to assist the gallant people of Bangladesh and their Mukti Bahini to Liberate their country from a reign of terror and to resist aggression on our own land".⁸⁸

All the members welcomed the announcement and this victory added to the prestige of Mrs Gandhi. Samer Guha remarked:

"The name of Prime Minister, Mrs Gandhi will go down in the history as the golden sword of liberation of Bangladesh."⁸⁹ And so Bangladesh became free but the US and China refused to reconcile themselves with the new developments in South Asia.

88. Lok Sabha Debates, vol.X, no.25, 16 December 1971, Col.145.

89. Ibid., Col. 147.

CHAPTER-IV

THE U.S.S.R. AND BANGLADESH

The Soviet Union had taken a considerable interest in South Asia in the post-war period partly to project its own ideology and partly to forestall Western and Chinese moves in the region prejudicial to its security. And so had gone out in a big way to cultivate the various countries of the region by means of trade, aid, technical and military assistance and cultural exchange. On the political plane, it has no doubt sought in its own way to win them over to its side in the context of the cold war. Where this has not been possible, it has encouraged them to stay either non-aligned or neutral.

For the facts that the Soviet Union is a Super power supported by a world-embracing ideology and neighbour of the region, and because the countries of South Asia have played a notable part in world affairs with their espousal of non-alignment, and are likely to continue to play an equally important role in the years to come in view of their strategic location on the Indian Ocean, their massive populations, their proximity to China and so, the Soviet Union, therefore, decided to promote friendly relations with both India and Pakistan and thus to reduce the Chinese influence in the region.

However, there were two major hurdles barring the way for the successful implementation of this policy: one was the mutual rivalry between India and Pakistan and the other was the latter's expectation of Chinese support in its conflict with India. Both these obstacles would have been removed with the establishment of an Awami League Government in Pakistan. This party was favourably disposed towards India and the pro-Peking forces of Pakistan were hostile to it. The non-aligned and peaceful foreign policy advocated by the Awami League was admirably suitable for the Kremlin. Soon after its victory in the December 1970 elections, an important Soviet journal in its international commentary appreciated the foreign policy outlined by the party in its programme.¹ The commentary referred to the Awami League's programme of withdrawal from all military blocs and its determination to adhere to "a policy of peaceful co-existence with all countries and the peaceful settlement of disputes with neighbouring countries". The declaration of the Awami League to settle the Kashmir question with India "on the basis of UN resolutions" and to solve peacefully the problem of the distribution of the water of Ganges which arouse in the context of India's constructions of the Farakka dam, was given particular

1. International Affairs (Moscow) March 1971, pp.73-75.

emphasis in the journal. It was probably expected by the Kremlin that in a parliamentary system headed by the Awami League, the Communist Party of Pakistan would regain its legal existence and in an atmosphere free from religious fanaticism, the pro-Moscow forces would be able to mould the politics of the country effectively. But as the transition to the Parliamentary System was being delayed due to the rise of insuperable differences of opinion over the drafting of the new constitution in Pakistan, the Soviet Government was perturbed. The Russian concern was clearly expressed by Viktor Mayevsky who wrote in Pravda on 6 March 1971, that "the Soviet people, who are closely following events in Pakistan, wish their neighbour a peaceful solution to the complicated problems that the Republic faces today"². The way in which President Yahya Khan ultimately tried to solve the problem was viewed by the Soviet Government as an attempt of the "reactionary" ruling group to maintain its authority by suppressing the people's verdict with force. Moscow undoubtedly preferred an Awami League Government to the continuation of the Yahya Khan's regime, which, in its opinion, was being controlled by "powerful local monopoly groups" and "foreign capital" and which looked mainly to Peking for assistance in its conflict with India.

2. Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XXIII, no.12, 20 April 1971, p.32.

The Soviet role in the Bangladesh crisis should therefore be seen from this background. And so, within a week of the beginning of the Pakistani holocaust in East Pakistan, the Soviet President Podgorny sent a message of appeal to President Yahya Khan on 2 April 1971, urging him to stop the bloodshed and seek a political solution of the problem "without use of force". An analysis of this message of appeal and a critical study of the reports and commentaries which appeared in the Soviet Press during the period clearly demonstrates that the Soviet sympathy lay, with the Awami League and other political forces allied to it in the struggle for liberation. In his message Podgorny wrote:

"The reports that the talks in Dacca had been broken off and that the military administration had found it possible to resort to extreme measures and used armed forces against the population of East Pakistan was met with great alarm in the Soviet Union". "Concern is also caused in the Soviet Union", he continued, "by the arrest and persecution of Mujibur Rehman and other politicians who had received such convincing support by the overwhelming majority of the population of East Pakistan at the recent general elections". The Soviet President then pointed out that the complex problems which had arisen, in Pakistan "can and must be solved politically, without the use of force", and added that the "continuation of repressive measures and bloodshed in East Pakistan will undoubtedly, only make the solution

of the problems more difficult and do great harm to the vital interests of the entire people of Pakistan". He, therefore, requested the then President Yahya Khan" to stop the bloodshed and repression against the population in East Pakistan" and to turn "to methods of a peaceful political settlement". In making this appeal the Soviet Government, he said, was being guided "by the generally recognised humanitarian principles recorded in the universal Declaration of Human Rights and by concern for the welfare of the friendly people of Pakistan", and he requested the Pakistan President not to misunderstand the "motive behind this appeal". It is our sincere wish that tranquillity and justice be established in East Pakistan in the shortest possible time", he wrote.³ The military measures were described by Podgorny as "repressive" and the concern for Human Rights prompted him to send the appeal. The situation thus created, could not, therefore, be regarded strictly as an internal problem of Pakistan and the Soviet President justified his message largely on that ground. It is significant that he never tried to conceal his sympathy for Mujibur Rehman and his party which had won the support of the overwhelming majority of the people of East Pakistan. Therefore, the "peaceful political settlement" and the establishment of "tranquillity and justice" in East

3. Pravda, 4 April 1971.

Pakistan which were referred to in Podgorny's letter virtually meant an acceptance of the election verdict.

Meanwhile the influx of refugees into India from East Pakistan continued unabated. The influx was causing India great concern.

During the crisis, the Pakistani military junta received assistance from both the US and China.⁴

The special Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Nixon, Dr. Henry Kissinger, issued a warning to the Indian Ambassador to the US, Mr. L.K. Jha, that in the event of China assisting, Pakistan in a war against India, India should never expect any help from the US.⁵ All these gave Pakistan the boldness to threaten India with war.

The Sino-US rapprochement with the help of Pakistan came to light. This greatly troubled both India and the USSR. They were both apprehensive of China taking side with Pakistan should there be a war between India and Pakistan.⁶

Under the present climate, Moscow found it impossible to maintain a non committal attitude. She extended its

4. Choudhuri, S., Beijing-Washington-Islamabad Entente. Genesis and Development (New Delhi, 1982) pp.62-63.

5. Iqbal Narain and Misra, K.P., (ed.), Pakistan Political System in Crisis (Jaipur, 1972) p.227.

6. Ram Raghunath, Super powers and Indo-Pakistani Sub-Continent, perceptions and policies, (New Delhi, 1985) p.343.

military support and used its diplomatic skill to localize the conflict. It sensed the dangers that were likely to attend a possible Chinese involvement in the Crisis, and so, on 5 December 1971, came out strongly in support of India and warned all powers to keep off the crisis.⁷

SOVIET UNION'S ROLE IN THE BANGLADESH CRISIS

The Soviet Union's attitude to the events in East Pakistan in 1971 was cautious and restrained.

It wanted the settlement of the crisis in Pakistan without outside interference. However, with the escalation of the crisis and the inability of General Yahya Khan to find an amicable solution to it, the Soviet Union became alarmed at the possibility of Western powers fishing in the troubled waters. The Soviet Union wanted a political solution to the crisis which in effect meant the transfer of power to the elected representatives of the Bengali people without which there could be no hope of peace in the region. The Soviet attitude should therefore be understood from the postures of the US and China which was not conducive to peace in the region.⁸

7. Ibid., pp.345-6.

8. Bhatia, V., (ed.) Indo-Soviet Relations, Problems and Prospects, (New Delhi, 1984), p.70.

The question that commonly comes to our minds is what made the Soviet Union to extend its support to India during the entire crisis? To this question, we now turn for answer.

There were certain factors that made the USSR to adopt the pro-India stand during the crisis. In the first instance, the Soviet Union realised that the crisis was getting out of hands and that remaining silent would be regarded as connivance at the actions of Pakistani rulers. This would greatly tarnish her image as a champion of the weak nations. It also dawned on Moscow that what was at stake in Bangladesh was the issue of self-determination and an urge for democratic rights on which the Soviet leaders could not admit of any compromise. Under these conditions, the best alternative left to her was to issue appeals and make statements which would cause a chain reaction among the world's big and small nations who would no more hesitate to come forward with moral, if not material support for the freedom fighters in Bangladesh.⁹ In the third place, Moscow had realized the importance of India in Asia. In view of the set up, it started cultivating India. This factor becomes clearer when we understand that Moscow had for a long time tried to get closer to Pakistan and even liberally supplied

9. The Motherland, 6 April 1971, (ed.), "Major Breakthrough".

arms to it but this proved unrewarding in the long run. Fourthly, the Soviet Union have a genuine admiration for the faithfulness which Indians are capable of showing towards those whom they have agreed to regard as their allies and friends. Fifthly, Moscow saw some threats from China and India fear from Pakistan drew both India and the USSR closer, therefore, the threat from China led Moscow to normalizing relations with India. As Moscow's wooing of Pakistan had hampered friendship with India, Moscow could not take any chance in ruining any chance of support in both Pakistan and India. India on her own needed a trusted supporter in its problems with Pakistan. China's friendly ties with Pakistan, and with the danger China herself constituted to India, drew India and the Soviet Union closer.¹⁰ Moreover, Moscow was convinced of the success of the Bengali movement as the whole of the seventy five million people of Bangladesh and the entire India with its government and people, were ardently behind the movement. Another factor that shaped Moscow pro-India attitude was that it saw the nature of the movement. The struggle, launched by a majority against minority oppression, was a moral issue in which fence sitting would amount to immorality.¹¹ And lastly it was Bhutto's trip to China that shattered Moscow's patience,

10. Shah Zafar, M.A., India and the Super powers, (New Delhi, 1983), p.38.

11. Deshpande, G.P., Soviet and Chinese Stakes in Mohammed Ayoob and Others, Bangladesh: A Struggle for Nationhood (New Delhi, 1971) p.114.

and from that date it extended more whole-hearted assistance to India. The Soviet Union's policy had a major impact in excluding the UN from the role the US and Pakistan wanted it to play. Moscow fully supported India when it was certain that the birth of Bangladesh as a nation was inevitable.¹²

The visit of Swaran Singh, India's Foreign Affairs Minister to Moscow in June was highly successful and the Soviet reaction to it was an unmistakable evidence of her unequivocal sympathy for the Indian stand vis-a-vis the Bangladesh issue.

Swaran Singh discussed with the Soviet leaders the developments in East Pakistan and their dangerous potentialities for peace and stability of the area. He explained the various problems - economic, social and political which the influx of refugees was creating for India. He stated how the problem of ensuring food and shelter to the refugees had become all the more complicated by the outbreak of epidemics.

A joint communique issued on the day he left (8 June 1971) after the completion of his visit, declared: "The two sides, after a detailed discussion on the various aspects of the problems created in this context consider that it is

12. Sharma, R., Bangladesh crisis and India foreign policy (New Delhi, 1978) pp.315-318.

imperative for immediate measures to be taken in East Pakistan which would ensure the stoppage of influx of refugees from East Pakistan. Simultaneously, it is desirable to take further steps to ensure that peace is restored and all conditions of security are created for the return of the refugees to their homes in East Pakistan. Taking into account the seriousness of the situation, the two sides agreed to remain in touch with each other in order to review the situation."¹³

Immediately after the conclusion of Swaran Singh's visit to Moscow the Soviet Press reported that the "serious situation created by the continuing flow of refugees from East Pakistan into the adjoining States of India" caused great concern to the Soviet Union, which was further accentuated by the Indian Foreign Affairs Minister's statement about the outbreak of epidemic in the refugee camps.¹⁴

The Soviet President Kosygin in a speech delivered on 9 June 1971 on the eve of elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR referred to this problem and said: "These events provoked profound alarm of the world public. All who

13. Bangladesh Documents, no.1, vol.1, p.512.

14. Ghosh, Sucheta, The Role of India in the emergence of Bangladesh (Calcutta, 1983) p.164.

treasure the principles of humanism must demand that conditions be created for the refugees returning to their homes, that their personal safety and opportunity to live and work calmly in East Pakistan be guaranteed. It is our opinion that such measures must be immediately taken by the Pakistani authorities. As in the past we come out for the peaceful solution of all problems arising in the relations between India and Pakistan and are convinced that such a policy would be in accord with the national interests of the peoples of India and Pakistan and the cause of procuring peace on the Hindustan peninsula. A different development of events would play into the hands of those internal and external forces which operate to the detriment of the interests of both India and Pakistan and pursue their own selfish aims".¹⁵ President Kosygin's speech was an unmistakable evidence of Soviet sympathy for India. It was an endorsement of India's stand by the Kremlin and there was no attempt to be neutral.¹⁶

Though Kosygin did not specify that the peaceful solution (which was the declared objective of India too) of the problem must have the sanction of the elected representatives of Bangladesh, his warning that "a different

15. Ibid., p.166.

16. Ibid.

development of events would play into the hands of those internal and external forces which operate to the detriment of the interests of both India and Pakistan" implied a disapproval of the way in which Yahya Khan was trying to solve the problem with the support of China and the US.

The supply of arms to the Yahya Khan's Government by the US was also condemned in the Soviet Press.¹⁷

President Nixon's decision to send Dr. Henry Kissinger to Peking at that stage and Nixon's continued military and economic support to Pakistan despite the genocide in East Pakistan,¹⁸ brought India and the USSR closer and they concluded a Treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation for twenty years on 9 August 1971.¹⁹

The treaty was viewed by Western diplomats in New Delhi as an important event ranking second only to Kissinger's trip to Peking. This was a demonstration of Moscow's pro-India stand in the Pakistani confrontation with India as a logical sequence to the American-Chinese support for the Yahya Khan's regime.²⁰ The USSR now realized why Pakistan

17. Ibid.

18. The Times of India (New Delhi) 9 August 1971, (edi): Timely Visit.

19. Survival, XIII, October 1971, pp.351-3.

20. The Hindu (Madras) 8 August 1971.

was threatening India with a war. The sending of Gromyko to New Delhi explains the extent to which Moscow was concerned about the crisis.

Two main issues came up for discussion with Gromyko-Bangladesh situation and the emergence of the Sino-American detente. Discussions were also held regarding India's need in defence equipments to meet the new threat from across the border.²¹

The treaty was aimed at preventing China from involving herself in any war that might break out between India and Pakistan, and also to deter Pakistan from unleashing a war on India.²² The treaty was widely interpreted as a warning to China. The Chinese initial response to the treaty was low-keyed. Later they abstained from issuing warnings about a likely "Indian aggression" as they had been doing before the treaty was signed.

Making some observations about the treaty, the Soviet Foreign Affairs Minister Gromyko said: We have been together at all times, good and bad. This was so in the past. It is occurring in the present for the friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and India do not rest on transient

21. Indian Express, (New Delhi) 11 August 1971.

22. Mohit Sen, "The Indo-Soviet Treaty", Economic and Political Weekly, 25 September 1971, pp.2047-8.

factors but on the lasting vital interests of our peoples and states and their interests in the maintenance of peace. Our relations are based on mutual trust, equality, respect and non-interference in each others internal affairs. The conclusion of the Indo-Soviet treaty lays a still stronger political and legal base for these relations.²³

The Pakistan Times, described the treaty as: a deliberate move to create a situation in which India may feel free to attack Pakistan with the assurance that the Soviet Commitment to go to the aid of India would provide a deterrent to any Chinese intervention on Pakistan's behalf.²⁴

Communist China regarded the treaty as unfriendly as far as she was concerned.²⁵ However, the USSR was not bothered about the reactions of Pakistan and China and warned India's unfriendly neighbours Pakistan and China to behave themselves otherwise they would in future have to reckon with the Indo-Soviet treaty with all its implications. The warning was explicit in the speech of the Foreign Affairs Minister of the USSR, A. Gromyko at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet which ratified the treaty.²⁶

23. Pravda, 10 August 1971.

24. The Pakistan Times, (ed.), "Encirclement", 11 August 1971.

25. The Hindu (Madras) 4 October 1971.

26. Bindra, S.S., Indo-Pak Relations, (New Delhi, 1981), p.142.

The Indo-Soviet treaty looked like the first of its kind in the Soviet system for containing Chinese power in Asia.²⁷

The US Government officials, journalists and intelligentsia condemned the treaty as "aggressive treaty".²⁸

Though the Indo-Soviet treaty was designated as being essentially a treaty of friendship between two countries, it had strong security undertones.²⁹

Whatever might be the long term significance of the treaty, its immediate aim was to facilitate India's task of solving the problem created by the large influx of refugees from Bangladesh without harming India's security.³⁰

The USSR from henceforth speeded up its diplomatic support for India and repeatedly reiterated its stand formulated earlier on, that the leaders of Pakistan should seek a political settlement with the elected representatives of the people of East Pakistan.

The joint statement issued at the end of Gromyko's visit to India on 12 August 1971, urged that "urgent steps

27. Ibid.

28. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 17 August 1971.

29. See Articles VIII, IX and X of the Indo-Soviet treaty, in Survival n.19, p.352.

30. Prasad, B., The Super Powers and the Sub-continent, Detente, (New Delhi, 1975) p.168.

be taken in Pakistan for the achievement of a political solution and for the creation of conditions of safety for the return of the refugees to their homes, which alone would guarantee the interests of the entire people of Pakistan and the cause of the preservation of peace in the area".³¹

The Soviet strategy towards the Bangladesh crisis became clearer after the conclusion of the treaty. On 11 August 1971, Spartak Boglov, the 'APN' political correspondent, in an article explaining the significance of the Indo-Soviet treaty referred to "the tragedy of East Pakistan" and the tension on the Indo-Pakistan border along with other problems of Asia such as the war in Indo-China, military blocs of SEATO and CENTO, Arab-Israel, conflict etc. and observed that the "main element" behind all these problems was the same, the confrontation between the forces of peace and war, between imperialism and the national liberation". He explained how "imperialism and the forces of war" tried to maintain their predominance by "direct military pressure" and by a "divide and rule policy", that is, by instigating one country against another. "The hegemonistic aspirations of peoples Republic of China leadership", he pointed out,

31. Ibid.

led Peking also to follow an imperialist line and, he continued: "... Peking makes active use of any means to set some countries against others. It is here, in the attempt to set some nations against others, that today lies the common point between 'left' opportunism and imperialism. It is enough to compare the conduct of Peking and Washington at various stages of the Indo-Pakistani conflict and during the latest Pakistani events for this analogy to emerge with particular clarity".³² It was thus evident that Moscow placed the problems of the sub-continent and those of West Asia or Vietnam on an equal footing and the policy of peace which she advocated for South Asia was not different from the policy she applied in those regions. The Soviet policy of peace, in other words, meant a policy in the interest of peace as Moscow understood it. It did not necessarily mean a peaceful policy without the use of arms.

During Mrs Gandhi's visit to Moscow, Kosygin explained the Soviet Stand more clearly when on 28 September he remarked: "It is impossible to justify the actions of the Pakistani authorities which have compelled over eight million people to leave their country, land, property and to seek shelter in neighbouring India. The mass flight of the population from East Pakistan can only be explained by

32. Soviet Review Supplement to issue 3, Vol. IX, 10 January 1972. pp.26-27.

unbearable living conditions created for them there".³³

Thus, Kosygin held Pakistan responsible for the crisis and maintained, like India, that Pakistan must first solve its East Pakistan problem taking the "legitimate interest" of the people into consideration.

Talking to Indian correspondents at Vnukovo Airport before Mrs Gandhi took off for home, Kosygin stated that: "No quarters which committed atrocities can ever enjoy our support. Our sympathies are with the democratic forces in Pakistan".³⁴ This again speaks volume for the sympathy of the USSR with the aspirations of the people of East Pakistan. It equally, demonstrates the Soviet Union's opposition to the military junta of Pakistan. In the joint statement issued at the conclusion of Mrs Gandhi's visit to the USSR, both the countries agreed that for the maintenance of peace in the area, "urgent measures" should be taken for "a political solution of the problem... paying regards to the wishes, the inalienable rights and lawful interests of the people of East Bengal as well as for the speediest and safe return of the refugees to their homeland in conditions of safeguarding their honour and dignity."³⁵

33. Ibid., p.16.

34. Vibhakar, J., A model Relationship, 25 Years of Indo-Soviet Diplomatic Ties (New Delhi, 1972) p.53.

35. Bangladesh Documents, Ministry of Ext. Affairs, (New Delhi, 1971) vol. 11, p.163.

The Stubborn refusal of Yahya Khan to start any negotiation with Sheikh Mujibur Rehman ultimately led the Soviets to support the rise of an independent Bangladesh. Following the events of 25 March, Moscow was, however, consistent in its opposition to the Pakistani policy. Islamabad's rule in East Pakistan was described in the Soviet press as "the military occupation regime in East Pakistan".³⁶

Meanwhile, the situation on the Indian border was further aggravated by the intransigent attitude adopted by Pakistan and so, on 22 October, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister, N.P. Firiyubin, arrived in New Delhi for consultations with the Government of India under Article IX of the Indo-Soviet treaty which was meant to be invoked only when either country faced external aggression.³⁷ The consultations demonstrated that the USSR meant business with India. On 30 October, Air Marshal P.S. Kutakov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Air Force arrived in New Delhi, for further consultations with the Indian Government.³⁸ On the day he arrived New Delhi, Pakistan had further stepped up its highly provocative war like acts on India

36. Soviet Review, n.32, p.30.

37. Prasad, B., n.30, pp.165-166.

38. Ibid., p.169.

borders in the West by sending two planes of its airforce into the airspace over Jammu and Kashmir. And between 1 and 26 October, Pakistan had committed 138 acts of violation along the 700 Kilometre cease-fire from Kargil in the North to Chhamb in the South.³⁹

Commenting on the tense situation, Senator Edward Kennedy stated on 1 November in Washington that the US Government "bears a special responsibility" for the threat of war between India and Pakistan. The Soviet press also condemned the US attitude towards India.⁴⁰

The Soviet Union once again called on the Pakistan government to stop aggression against the Bengalis and seek political settlement.⁴¹

V. Kudryavtsev, leading a Soviet Parliamentarians' delegation, arrived in New Delhi on 6 November in connection with the observance of the Indo-Soviet Friendship Month. Speaking at a luncheon meeting at the Press Club of India on 9 November, he noted new dimensions in the struggle of East Bengal and described it as a "national liberation movement with elements of civil war."⁴² Referring to the

39. Vibhakar, J., n.34, p.55.

40. Ibid., p.55-56.

41. Ibid., p.56.

42. The Times of India (New Delhi) 10 November 1971.

Soviet Air Chief's talks with Indian leaders, he declared at Poona on 13 November: "Military experts always discuss secretly. But let me assure you that in the event of any attack of madness either by a person or a nation, the 25 crore people of the Soviet Union with their might shall back India as her trusted friend".⁴³

On 11 November, the Indian Ambassador to the USSR Dr. K.S. Shelvankar met the Soviet Defence Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko. The Indian Ambassador was assured of Soviet assistance to India to cope with its troubles in keeping with the spirit of the Indo-Soviet treaty.⁴⁴

While the Soviet Union was publicly urging a peaceful settlement of the crisis, it took steps at the same time to equip India against any eventuality of war. In the months preceding the actual fighting in December 1971, it was reported that the Soviet Union had delivered eight shiploads of arms to India.⁴⁵

On 25 November 1971, Yahya Khan said at a dinner for a visiting Chinese delegation that in 10 days time he might be away fighting a war. And he was not kidding.⁴⁶ At last,

43. Vibhakar, J., n.34, p.56.

44. The Times of India (New Delhi) 12 November 1971.

45. The New York Times, 30 November 1971.

46. Chaudhuri, S., n.4., p.70.

Pakistan declared war on India by simultaneously bombing several Indian airfields on 3 December 1971. India had to fight back to defend itself.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE INDO-PAKISTAN WAR

The Soviet Union backed India during the war, since it was not in favour of settling the crisis by force, this was so because it apprehended that the crisis might be internationalized if any attempt was made to resolve it through force. But when war broke out between India and Pakistan, it had no other alternative but to take side with India in keeping with the Indo-Soviet treaty.⁴⁷

Brezhnev while addressing the sixth congress of the Polish Workers Party declared: that the Soviet Union's position was that the current Indo-Pakistan fighting should come to an end without any external interference.⁴⁸

With the Pakistani attack, after Yahya Khan's 10 days time threat of war, it became clear to Moscow that the attack was pre-planned and with an aim to take the issue to the United Nations. Moscow resisted all attempts to involve outside powers, its aim was to localize the war so much

47. Sharma, R., n.12, p.304.

48. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) 8 December 1971.

so that it was not prepared to have even the UN have any thing to do with the crisis. This explains why the Soviet delegates at the UN rested the responsibility for the conflict in Bangladesh on the policies and actions of the government of Pakistan.

Jacob Malik, while defending India against the US allegations of charging India of aggression and against the accusation of "border incursions", declared: the situation in East Bengal had arisen because of the action of the military authorities. As a result of terror and force used against the people of East Bengal, millions of them had fled to India and became refugees. This was one reality which had to be noted. He continued to say, it would be a great mistake to put India and Pakistan on par in this matter.⁴⁹

THE SOVIET UNION'S ROLE IN THE UNITED NATIONS DURING THE CRISIS

With the request of the US representative in the United Nations, the Bangladesh crisis was presented in the Security Council on 4 December 1971. A draft resolution was introduced seeking an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani troops to their own sides

49. Vibhakar, J., n.34, pp.57-58.

of the Indo-Pakistani borders, and at the same time, George Bush accused India of an "incursion across the border of East Pakistan"⁵⁰. A similar resolution was introduced the following day.

The Soviet Union vetoed both the resolutions. Eleven members voted for the resolution. Britain and France abstained from voting, the USSR and Poland casted negative votes. The statesman, thanked the Soviet Union for its Veto which had debarred the Security Council from calling for a cease-fire in the Indo-Pakistani war⁵¹.

The Soviet delegate pointed out that withdrawal of forces without a political settlement in East Pakistan would only serve to perpetuate tyranny and oppression in Bangladesh, cease-fire, therefore, he added, must go simultaneously with a political settlement; the one could not be separated from the other⁵². The Soviet delegate proposed the issuing of a call to Pakistani forces to stop "acts of violence" in East Pakistan, this was rejected in the Security Council. Meanwhile, China had tabled a resolution, seeking the condemnation of India for its role in the conflict. The Chinese resolution accused India of launching a large-scale attack on Pakistan and urged all people to extend support

50. SCOR, S/PV 1606, 4 December 1971, p.91.

51. The Statesman (ed.), (New Delhi), "At least some Friends" 6 December 1971.

52. Prasad, B., n.30, p.170.

to the Pakistanis. It also called for a cease-fire and withdrawal of troops from the Indo-Pakistan borders. The Soviet representative said that the Chinese resolution was unacceptable to the Soviet Union and indicated that he would veto the same.⁵³ With this, no decision could be reached on how to end the Indo-Pakistan conflict, and so on 7 December 1971, the US referred the matter to the General Assembly as the Security Council had proved ineffective in the conflict.⁵⁴

The Tass, in a report on 7 December blamed the US and China chiefly for the inability of the UN Security Council to resolve the Indo-Pakistan conflict and described the Council's decision to refer the matter to the General Assembly as an attempt aimed at preventing the adoption of a decision directed at a just settlement of the conflict with due regards for the essence of the problem created in East Bengal by the actions of the Pakistani authorities. The General Assembly adopted the resolution on the same day.⁵⁵

Pakistan accepted to implement the General Assembly's resolution,⁵⁶ while India refused to do same and informed the Secretary-General of the UN accordingly.⁵⁷

53. Vibhakar, J., n.34, p.59.

54. UN Documents A/RES/2793, 7 December 1971.

55. Vibhakar, J., n.34, pp.59-60.

56. A/8567 and S/10440, 9 December 1971.

57. A/8580 and S/10445, 12 December 1971.

The Soviet delegate moved his own resolution calling upon the Security Council to take up its draft resolution, which called for a cease-fire, but this was not considered because the US delegate had indicated that he would not accept it unless it was linked with military withdrawal.⁵⁸

The Soviet Union, along with Cuba, Mongolia and Bhutan and most of the East European Countries, voted with India in the UN General Assembly and opposed the resolution which called upon India and Pakistan to "take forthwith all measures for an immediate cease-fire and for the withdrawal of their armed forces" from each other's territory. Jacob Malik, referring to the move for a cease fire and withdrawal of forces, said that this would not help in restoring peace as troops would be left with free hands to continue their repression against the Bengalis. And so, requested the General Assembly not to close its eyes to political realities.⁵⁹

The Soviet press, also criticized the UN General Assembly's resolution and the Sino-US collusion in the UN. Yuri Zhukov observed in Pravda:

"They palm off such projects as are peaceful on the surface but are in reality charged with dynamite, projects

58. Vibhakar, J., n.34, p.60.

59. Ibid.

the implementation of which will only aggravate the situation. Precisely this purpose is served by the intensive attempts over the recent days to concentrate all the attention on calls for cease-fire leaving aside the causes of conflict".⁶⁰

The Soviet Union used its veto in the Security Council on 14 December for the third time to block the US resolution calling for an immediate Indo-Pakistani cease-fire and troops withdrawal of both sides. This time the matter was brought to the Security Council because India did not consider it proper to accept the General Assembly's resolution.⁶¹

As the threat increased of the widening of the Indo-Pakistani conflict, with the possibility of external intervention, India and the USSR took steps to ensure the continuance of high-level consultations among themselves. D.P. Dhar, the Chairman of the Policy Planning Committee for External Affairs flew to Moscow and met A.N. Kosygin and other Soviet leaders in connection with the situation in the Indian sub-continent.⁶²

60. Pravda, 10 December 1971.

61. Vibhakar, J., n.34, p.61-62.

62. Ibid., p.61.

SEVENTH FLEET AND THE SOVIET'S ROLE

As the discussion on the Indo-Pakistan conflict was going on at the UN, President Nixon on 9 December ordered the Task Force to proceed to the Bays of Bengal. The motive behind this ugly design according to the Soviet Union was to discourage India from striking against West Pakistani forces.⁶³

The Soviet Union knew of the movement of the Seventh Fleet and assured India that the Seventh Fleet being sent by the US was being monitored as it was followed by the Soviet Flotilla and therefore, it was not likely to intervene because it was aware that the commander of the Russian Task Force was authorized to take action should the Americans or the Chinese intervene.⁶⁴

Condemning the US action of sending the Seventh Fleet, the Soviet Union accused it of using "gross blackmail and pressure" against India in violation of the UN Charter. "What business has an American naval squadron in the Indian ocean"? asked the Pravda Commentator, Konstantin Geivandov. "Why should they turn up in direct proximity to the area

63. The Times (London) 8 December 1971.

64. The Times of India (New Delhi) 18 December 1971.

of military operations between the Pakistani army on the one side and the Mukti Bahini detachments and the Indian troops interacting with them, on the other"?⁶⁵

During the war, the Soviet Union set up two observation Satellite-Cosmos 463 and Cosmos 464 - in quick succession (on 6 and 10 December 1971) to overlook the battle areas and also keep track of American warship movements.⁶⁶ Moscow also supplied modern arms to India to enable it meet any eventuality. It was reported, that the 'Ghazi' submarine, an American gift to Pakistan, could only be blown off by some most sophisticated nuclear weapons which no one else except Russia had in its possession. These were given to India by Moscow to deal with war machines supplied by America to Pakistan.⁶⁷

During the entire crisis, India remained in high spirits because of its faith in the Russians in case of any aggression on her.⁶⁸

D.P. Dhar on the 14 December, while expressing India's gratitude said: 'This feeling gave us sustenance and moral

65. Pravda, 16 December 1971.

66. Indian Express (New Delhi) 8 January 1971.

67. Sharma, R., n.12, pp.315-6.

68. The Times of India (New Delhi) 29 October 1971.

strength when we were faced with hostile and unsympathetic voices but your support was not merely spiritual, it was material also'.⁶⁹ In fact, India made many demands on the Russians and they responded to India's satisfaction: Referring to the generosity with which the Soviet Union responded to India's requirements, Dhar said: 'you know how insistent, how demanding, how apparently unreasonable a nation fighting for the defence of its values in a hostile world can be... but in such difficult days no friend could have been more generous, more prompt and more understanding'.⁷⁰

As for the co-ordinated actions of America and China, Schulzberger wrote in the New York Times, that the USA and China found themselves co-belligerents in backing Pakistan.⁷¹ According to James Reston, the US President supported Pakistan because he saw in the sub-continent the power struggle between China and the Soviet Union.⁷² Simultaneously, Beijing leadership too resorted to highly provocative actions. The Chinese Ambassador assured Yahya Khan of Chinese troops "advancing towards the Indian border".⁷³

69. The National Herald, 16 December 1971.

70. Ibid.

71. The New York Times, 2 February 1972.

72. Chaudhuri, S., n.4., p.73.

73. Ibid.

The whole course of events demonstrated that the Chinese were merely 'playing to the gallery with no intention of involving themselves directly in the conflict. The Pakistanis learnt that their 'friend forever' was only interested in "sitting on the hilltop while two tigers fight".⁷⁴

With the surrender of the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan, India having no desire to unnecessarily prolong the war announced a unilateral cease-fire on the Western front which the Pakistanis readily accepted and became effective from 17 December 1971. Thus, ending the worst crisis in the history of the sub-continent since 1947.⁷⁵

A Soviet Commentator, T. Beryozov, in his article "the Roots of the Crisis", maintained that: "the terror unleashed by the Islamabad regime gave rise to the movement for the independence of East Bengal - Bangladesh in Bengali - and the formation of the Mukti Bahini Liberation forces".⁷⁶

The attitude of the Soviet Union was highly appreciated in India and so, expressing India's gratitude, Mrs Gandhi, on 17 December 1971, wrote a letter to the Soviet Premier thanking him for standing by India throughout the crisis.⁷⁷

74. Ibid., p.74.

75. Prasad, B., n.30, p.171.

76. The New Times, No.51, December 1971, p.11.

77. The Times of India (New Delhi), 19 December 1971.

CONCLUSION

The embittered relations between India and Pakistan since the birth of the latter could be accounted for with problems such as the minorities, border, river water, evacuee property, the integration of princely states - Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir, Hindu-Muslim rivalry and ideology, all these made the relations between the two countries very complicated.

The other factors like Pakistan's joining military pacts, friendship between India and the USSR, the Sino-Pak collusion, the Sino-India War of 1962, the Kutch episode and the Indo-Pak war of 1965, all these factors greatly disturbed the relations between India and Pakistan.

Pakistan's bid to snatch Kashmir from India was the main reason responsible for the 1965 conflict between India and Pakistan. After the termination of the 1965 war, a conference was called at Tashkent on the initiative of the USSR, and it succeeded in getting the Declaration signed.

After the Declaration, many other factors played important role in increasing the tensions between the two countries. These include, hostile propaganda against each other, the Kashmir issue, minority problem, border violations, expulsion of diplomats, the auction of the Indian property in Pakistan, Farakka Barrage dispute, Agartala conspiracy case and the arms given by the US to Pakistan.

Pakistan also supplied arms and ammunition to the Mizos and Nagas rebels and tried to dismember India. This act of interference in India's affairs is a clear case of a breach of Article iii of the Tashkent declaration, which forbids interference in each others internal affair, and also demonstrated Pakistan's lukewarm attitude towards the normalisation of its relations with India.

The year 1971 was a landmark in the history of Indo-Pak relations. The struggle for power in Pakistan started after the results of the election were announced in which Sheikh Mujibur Rehman's Awami League stood in a position to form the government, while the Pakistan People's Party led by Z.A. Bhutto emerged the main opposition.

In 1971, a war was fought between India and Pakistan which finally led to the birth of an independent sovereign state of Bangladesh. The struggle for power at the initial stage was mainly directed towards the transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people but subsequent events, compelled the Awami League to declare East Pakistan as an independent sovereign state. The declaration gave a rude shock to the Pakistan Government and had to use every available means to crush the Bengalis. The Pakistani army committed unprecedented atrocities on these people. Millions of them had to flee East Pakistan for their lives and they came to India for refuge, this created innumerable problems -

social, economic and political for India, but India, in keeping with her tradition and civilization did not hesitate to give shelter to them. It was this refugee problem, which in turn compelled the Indian Government to plead the case of East Pakistanis, but she never nursed the idea of dismembering Pakistan, as she continuously stressed on the political settlement of the issue - which meant transfer of power to the elected people and subsequently enable these refugees to return to their country. India by not recognising Bangladesh not until after the Pakistani military junta attacked her on 3 December 1971 is an obvious evidence to prove that she was not in favour of dismembering Pakistan, nothing should have debarred her from doing so earlier before 6 December 1971 when she recognised Bangladesh.

The misfortune of Pakistan was that the Bengalis never realised that they were the citizens of a free country, they constantly nursed the idea that the power transferred in 1947 was for the West Pakistanis to use it for their benefit at the cost of the East Bengalis. Economically, they remained a down trodden people. So the revolt in East Bengal was, in the main, the revolt of an economically oppressed people against their oppressors. This situation could not be tolerated for long.

While tackling the Bangladesh crisis in 1971, India had to overcome several constraints which earlier could

make and unmake its policy. One of them was India's undue sensitiveness to what the US reactions would be towards a particular line of action India proposed to take because the US was the foremost aid-giver and could use aid as leverage to compel India to do its biddings. In this crisis Indian government stood firm on what it considered to be the correct attitude. Not only that but also presuming that the US would try to pressurize India. The Indian government was prepared to take effective measures to neutralise its moves. In this respect one factor stood India in good stead, and that was the friendly relations it had with the USSR which was given explicit form in the Indo-Soviet treaty of 9 August 1971. In view of this development, the US could not dare to take any adventurous step.

India's initial response to the situation created by the military crackdown in East Bengal and influx of some 10 million refugees was bewilderment, helplessness, and initial indecisiveness. India was especially staggered by the warning that it should expect no assistance from the US in the event of Chinese intervention. Given the obvious bias of the Nixon Administration, the apparent tacit alliance between the US and China against her, the threat to her political existence and national integration, India finally determined to defy the US in the Bangladesh crisis. It entered into a treaty with the Soviet Union to

assure diplomatic protection in case of a war in the sub-continent. When the war erupted, India was able to inflict a severe military defeat on America's proxy, Pakistan, and administered a serious diplomatic reversal to the Nixon Administration. In the process, India created a new strategic environment and stood forth as the dominant power in the sub-continent.

The Soviet Union remained a firm friend of India throughout the crisis. They not only helped but consistently assured India of their help in any emergency. Perhaps, the overriding factor that enlisted Soviet support for India, was that in International sphere, the Soviet Union felt isolated because of President Nixon's move to woo China. The Indo-Soviet treaty of friendship between India and the USSR was a product of the crisis in Bangladesh and Nixon's announcement to visit Peking, in these two developments both India and the USSR felt concerned and so had to devise a means which could be of mutual help and further their national interests.

The year 1971 marked an absolute low point in post-war relations between the US and India. A series of US actions and postures, flowing out of President Nixon's decision to "tilt" against India, brought the two countries to such a pass: the refusal to comment adversely on the military crackdown and genocide in East Bengal, the continued shipment of arms to West Pakistan, the evident lack of

sympathy for India while it reeled under the economic and social impact of 10 million refugees, the reflex condemnation of India as it finally sought to protect its interests through intervention, the suspension of all aid, and finally the despatch of a US naval task force to the Bay of Bengal in an obvious show of force. The Anderson papers subsequently revealed the depth of hostility of the Nixon Administration towards India during the crisis.

Though Nixon's disaffection with India and Indian leaders and, conversely, his respect and warmth for Pakistani leaders, was manifested during the crisis, it would not be very right for us to conclude that the US policy in the region is that of personalities. Personal relations have undoubtedly had some influence, but more perhaps on the style in which policy has been executed than on the policy itself. It is obvious that Nixon's record of opposition of communism did not interfere with detente with the Soviet Union or with the reversal of policy on China. Behind the various discreet foreign policy actions of the US lies a larger global strategy, a more coherent conceptual framework. This has been true of US foreign policy during the entire post-war period.

The American grand design in the post-war period has focused on the structure of super power relationships. The US foreign policy has thus derived its driving force not in reference to a given country, but to one or more

world powers. The US foreign policy towards India is merely the local application of a global strategy, which has little to do with India specifically except in so far as India is seen as an available instrument or an unnecessary obstacle in the execution of that strategy. The US foreign policy has often been couched in highly moral terms, but has been rooted in realpolitik, designed to serve the US own national interests. Thus, not surprisingly, the US foreign policy in the post-war period has embraced all manner of political regimes, as long as this served US national interests. The US foreign policy of containment has been its basic strategy in South Asia. The US has therefore been quite firm with its allies, ruthless and even brutal with its foes, and both scornful and stern towards neutrals. This explains why India has often been the recipient of the fury of this global strategy.

It has therefore, been the determined policy of the US, since the end of World War II to see that no new independent centres of power arise.

During the first period, from 1945-1955, the US was the dominant super power - having for the first half of this period a monopoly of nuclear weapon, and in the second half an overwhelming superiority.

In the first half of this period, India was too pre-occupied with domestic tasks to pay much attention to world affairs. It was both suspicious and favourably

inclined towards the US - suspicious because it perceived the US as successor to the British imperial policy of divide and rule in South Asia. (US policy on Kashmir and other local issues was evidence of this; Nehru saw US anti-communism as essentially facilitating the extension of US power throughout the world); favourably inclined, because it was uncertain about the intentions of both the USSR and China, while faced with communist insurrection at home.

India assuming the leadership of the group of non-aligned nations, came to be viewed by the US decision - makers both as a continuous irritant and as an inveterate claimant to an independent role in international politics. India's policy became objectionable not only because it placed an obstacle in the way of the US policy towards the USSR, but also because it attempted to create an additional world force. Accordingly, Pakistan was armed to the teeth as a counter of India's policy. The maintenance of military parity between India and Pakistan by the US should be seen as having initially been solely the consequence of a global policy of containment aimed at the Soviet Union and China. The military parity between India and Pakistan thus became the first pillar of post-war US foreign policy in South Asia.

The second period in US foreign policy covers the years from 1955 to 1962. The USSR now quickly jumped over

the line of containment and established friendly relations with important Third world countries such as India and Egypt, who were eager for that, for the local US military alliances had limited their status in international politics. As a consequence, the US now placed a major emphasis on economic instruments in winning over the countries in the region, while acknowledging the virtues of nationalism and independence among them. The second pillar of US policy towards the region in general and India in particular emerged from this.

As economic relations between India and the US developed, so did political relations. Relations also advanced because of the deterioration of India's relationship with China. The cordial relations between India and the US became marred because of India's action in Goa without informing the US.

However, in 1962 the Indo-US relations reached a new peak, with the Sino-Indian border war and the US readiness to ship small arms to India. The US was prepared to be India's military protector, if India accepted the role of US client and protectorate, but was not ready to help India establish the where withal to become an independent centre of power.

The US readiness to assure India of air protection revealed a third pillar, which had, perhaps, been implicit all along. This was not welcomed by Pakistan.

The third post-war period roughly corresponds to the years 1963 to 1968. The two super powers now sought to maintain their unique positions by working together to prevent the elevation of any other nations to subject roles in international politics, resulting in cooperation in the isolation and containment of China, in the Test Ban Treaty, and in the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

However, larger strategic interests were paramount. With the containment of China as its first priority in Asia, the US was not ready to countenance any further weakening of the Indian polity. On the other hand Pakistan's close relationship with China annoyed the US.

The strains of the Vietnam crisis, led the US to tentatively concede the responsibility for the settlement between India and Pakistan to the USSR. Earlier, the two super powers had cooperated in the United Nations to bring the 1965 India-Pakistan war to an end before intervention by China could aggravate matters.

The US, due to demands on it arising from the Vietnam crisis, developed aid weariness in relation to India, and foundations of the second pillar - massive aid to counter Soviet influence began to erode. But the US would not allow the Soviet Union or China to emerge effortlessly as a dominant external power in either India

or Pakistan - It would maintain a strong enough presence to balance the Soviet Union in India, and China and the Soviet Union in Pakistan.

The fourth period began with the Nixon Administration in 1969. The US role in India was eroding while that of the Soviet Union was growing, and President Nixon forged a new strategy to place the international order on a different footing. It acknowledged the limitations of US power, and accordingly determined to reduce its commitments in Asia. The key motivation, however, was to preserve the US's position as chief subject in international politics. Accordingly, in an endeavour to place constraints on the Soviet Union's expanding role, to persuade it to make concessions, and to facilitate the extrication of the US from Vietnam, the US moved towards a rapprochement with China as a third "subject" in international politics.

The decision to move towards a rapprochement with China eliminated the rationale for US support for India as part of the policy of containment against China. On the contrary, the US soon acknowledged China in its new subject role as having legitimate interests in South Asia, primarily in the containment of India through support of Pakistan.

In the pursuit of a more fruitful relationship with China, the prevention of a possible economic or political weakening of India was no longer of Central concern to the US. Apparently, India was now written off by the Nixon Administration, merely because of its refusal to subordinate its interests to those of the US, and because of the growing intimacy between India and the USSR.

The US policy during the Bangladesh crisis was therefore not totally unexpected. Its policy was received with moral reprobation in India and in many other parts of the world, including the US. This may have been justified, but that policy must also evoke awe for its consistency. Its chief aim was to safeguard the developing US relations with China.

The role of the People's Republic of China in the crisis of the sub-continent in 1971, illustrates the view that Peking made a gross error of judgement about India and is now trying to rectify this. China's behaviour in 1971 was based on a mixture of the following components: that nothing would happen militarily because the Indians were simply talkers; that the US was there to support Pakistan; that Pakistan was in a strong position militarily; that Bangladesh was not capable of fighting. On these, Peking thought it was backing the winner. Furthermore, the anti-

India reasoning was shaped by China's geo-political thinking. When India signed the Indo-Soviet treaty in August 1971, this strengthened the Chinese belief that she was playing the Soviet game of encirclement. India, therefore had to be stopped, China thus supported Pakistan to the last.

The dynamics of Chinese decision - making during and after the 1971 war point to two interesting features. First, having backed the losing side, the Peking leadership could not easily retreat from its original line that Bangladesh was created by the Indian "reactionaries" and that developments in the sub-continent represented a part of the Soviet game of encirclement. The problem of saving face led China to encourage Pakistan to take a tough stand on the question of recognizing Bangladesh. Such encouragement became apparent when Mr. Z.A. Bhutto failed to implement his promise made at the Simla Summit to recognize Bangladesh by August 1972. China's veto of Bangladesh's UN membership was also a logical consequence of her earlier policy towards India.

The second feature, which became apparent more recently, suggests that China's style of thinking has changed, and this in turn has altered her assessment of India's external behaviour. Consequently, her idea that India is a part of the Soviet policy of encirclement has changed; that is, the obsession with the Soviet threat has not changed but the perception that the Indians were a part of this scheme has.

The above explains the Chinese reaction during the entire crisis of 1971. Peking accepted Islamabad's account about the origin and character of the Bangladesh problem, denounced India's interference in Pakistan's internal affairs and promised full support to President Yahya Khan against the danger of an external aggression. There was no humanitarian aspect in China's reaction - no criticism of Islamabad's military action against the Bengalis, no sympathy for India on account of the refugee burden and no contribution for any relief purpose. Peking declared India as an aggressor and so took side with Pakistan.

Unlike the US and China's support to Pakistan the USSR sided with India. The forces that made the USSR to support India could be seen from her policy towards the sub-continent.

When India become independent and power transferred to both India and Pakistan in 1947, the USSR failed to grasp the significance of India's independence in the region. The Soviet reaction to India independence was distinctly unfriendly.

The Mountbatten-Plan, under which independence was given to India and Pakistan, was criticized, and the leadership of the Congress Party was considered to have gone over to reaction by agreeing to British terms for a political settlement. Nehru, who had been regarded as a progressive liberal, was now accused of having moved to the

right with such reactionary leaders as Patel. Even Gandhi was not spared. The Indian policy of non-alignment was also condemned and was considered to justify a policy of collaboration with English Capitalism, a policy of establishing closer contact between the India bourgeoisie and English Capitalism. The Pro-west stand of Nehru equally led to the less cordial attitude of the USSR towards India.

However, in order to obviate the inevitable impression that India was slowly sliding in the Western Camp, Nehru, at the same time, made it a point to express openly his anti-imperialist views.

With the communization of China, the relations between India and the Soviet Union became even more strained. For the Soviet leaders, the communist revolution in China was only a confirmation of the long-held view regarding the potentialities of communist revolutions in Asia. The USSR while welcoming the communization of China, was equally fearful of the important influence China could exercise on the Asian Communist Parties.

For India, the dramatic events of China were hardly a favourable sign, for they had not only skewed the Asian balance of power in favour of the apparently monolithic communist world, but had, with the Chinese occupation of Tibet, brought a dynamic and unfriendly communist State to the very doors of India. Under this situation, alliance with the west was excluded, so also alliance

with the Communist world because of India's policy of non-alignment. A new approach had therefore become necessary for India so far as the Communist countries were concerned.

First of all, a number of political and military steps were taken to strengthen India's defence.

But most of these steps were primarily diplomatic, administrative and police measures. Defence preparations were avoided because of a fear of an adverse reaction from China and because of economic reasons.

However, India soon realized that the best line of action was political rapprochement with the communist world. And so India started to seek normalization and complete understanding with the communist China, which slowly started abandoning its belligerent line. India was no longer considered to be tied to the apron strings of the West.

Within a short time after the shift in Chinese policy, the USSR too began to show definite signs of change and she was not prepared to leave the region to Chinese influence.

A rapid change was therefore instituted in Soviet ideological thinking and policy. Instead of striving for immediate control over these areas, Soviet diplomacy now limited its objective to the task of detaching them from the "Imperialist bloc", and then slowly attaching them to the "camp of peace and socialism".

The Soviet Union had therefore taken a considerable interest in South Asia in the post-war period partly to project its own ideology and partly to forestall Western and Chinese moves in the region, prejudicial to its security. And so had gone out in a big way to cultivate the various countries of the region by means of trade, aid, technical and military assistance, and cultural exchange. On the political plane, it has no doubt sought in its own way to win them over to its side in the context of the Cold war. Where this has not been possible, it has encouraged them to stay either non-aligned or neutral.

For the facts that the Soviet Union is a super power supported by a World - embracing ideology and neighbour of the region and because the countries of South Asia have played a notable part in world affairs with their espousal of non-alignment and are likely to continue to play an equally important role in the years to come in view of their strategic location on the Indian ocean, their massive populations, their promixity to China, and so on. The USSR aim in the region was therefore, to promote friendly relations with both India and Pakistan and thus to reduce the Chinese influence in the region. However, there were two major hurdles barring the way for the successful implementation of this policy: one was the mutual rivalry between India and Pakistan and the other was the latter's

expectation of Chinese support in its conflict with India. Both these obstacles would have been removed with the establishment of an Awami League Government in Pakistan. The USSR saw that, that party was favourably disposed towards India, but the pro-Peking forces of Pakistan were hostile to it. The non-aligned and peaceful foreign policy advocated by the Awami League was admirably suitable for the Kremlin. The USSR expected that in a Parliamentary system headed by the Awami League, the Communist Party of Pakistan would regain its legal existence and in an atmosphere free from religious fanaticism, the pro-Moscow forces would be able to mould the politics of the country effectively. But the confusion that overtook the country in the course of transition to the parliamentary system over the drafting of the new constitution, became a source of great concern for Moscow. The way in which President Yahya Khan ultimately tried to solve the problem was not acceptable to the Soviet Government. Moscow undoubtedly preferred an Awami League Government to the continuation of the Yahya Khan's regime which it considered was being controlled by "powerful local monopoly groups" and "foreign capital" and which looked mainly to Peking for assistance in its conflict with India.

So when the Pakistani crisis erupted, the Soviet Union intervened openly.

On 2 April 1971, Nikolai Podgorny sent a message to Yahya Khan in his capacity as head of the Soviet State, expressing concern at the sufferings and privations of the people of Bangladesh and urged, an immediate stoppage of the bloodshed and a "peaceful political settlement" with the elected leaders of the people. But Yahya Khan ignored the Kremlin's appeal. Meanwhile the US got involved and issued a warning to India that in the event of Chinese intervention in the crisis, India should not expect US help. The Indian saw Pakistan as successfully coordinating its policies with Peking and Washington. India stood isolated.

In the midst of this Indian predicament, came the diplomatic explosion of our time, which was the secret journey of Kissinger to Peking that was arranged through the good offices of Pakistan, and the announcement of an upcoming Nixon visit to China. The Sino-American diplomatic breakthrough created identical perceptions in India and the USSR of an emerging "alliance" between the US and China that would be directed against the Soviet Union. Since Pakistan was a firm ally of China, the new Sino-US linkage could work in South Asia only to the detriment of India.

Perceptions of a looming threat to the vital interests and even the survival of India and the Soviet global interests cemented the Indo-Soviet relationship on 9 August 1971, with a

20 year treaty of peace, friendship, and cooperation. The treaty committed the Soviet Union to meet the security needs of India in the event of aggression or threat of aggression.

In signing the treaty the Indians did not believe that they gave the USSR more than they expected to get from their ally. The Indian government claimed that the treaty ended the isolation of India, safeguarded its independence and territory, and was a deterrent to aggression from any quarter. The test of the treaty lay in how India used it to gain its own strategic objectives in the sub-continent, that is, by securing Bangladesh, by fighting a war with Pakistan and avoided the involvement of China in the war.

The war that was fought between India and Pakistan for two weeks in December 1971, saw the Soviet Union taking a firm stand by India. Two days after the outbreak of the war, the Soviet Union warned all nations to keep out of it: the message was obviously addressed to Peking. The Soviet Union blamed the war on the refusal by Pakistan to come to a political settlement with the elected leaders of the Bangladesh people. It called for the speediest ending of bloodshed, and in the UN Security Council it vetoed three resolutions backed by the United States and China calling for an immediate cease-fire. When the US government dispatched a naval task force into the Bay of Bengal, presumably to

intervene, the Soviet Union assured the Indian government that it will not allow the Seventh Fleet to intervene in the Bangladesh War. The USSR also helped India by providing it with arms. And so, the Soviet stood by India throughout the crisis. Indira Gandhi declared a unilateral cease-fire immediately after the Pakistani surrender in Bangladesh whether she did this on her own or under Soviet pressure, it was the crowning success for Soviet diplomacy during the war. It earned the USSR credit from Nixon himself for restraining India from a conquest of West Pakistan. This tribute enabled the Pakistani elite to see the Soviet Union as a saviour of Pakistan. Though India never had the designs to carry the war to West Pakistan, but China and the US had this apprehension. The role of the Soviet Union was highly appreciated in India.

In the changed environment in the sub-continent, the US is sure to realise that it cannot hope to contain Soviet influence in South Asia by pitting a hostile Pakistan against India.

A comment on the United Nations role in the entire crisis might not be out of place here. The United Nations proved a total failure in the crisis, because she was being controlled by the imperialists. The debates and resolutions in the United Nations were obviously one sided.

On the basis of the above study, we may suggest the following ways and manners to avoid a similar occurrence in future.

For the normalization of Indo-Pak relations, it is suggested that both the countries should enter into direct negotiations in an effort to solve the existing problems without a third party; Pakistan should abandon its relentless pursuit in international fora to seek equality with India in almost every field, because this drive seems to increase the tension between the two countries; India and Pakistan should sign a no-war pact as this would militate against a future war between them. An external agency like the UN should be accepted by the two countries as the enforcement agent; efforts should be made to make the people of Pakistan to shed the feeling that India is out to devour Pakistan and also the Indians to shed the feeling that Pakistan wants to disintegrate India; trade between the two countries should be enhanced and where there is any fear on either side of goods from one side dominating the other's market, efforts should be made to sort out the barriers on the basis of experience.

We may be tempted to suggest that the fact that Pakistan has failed until now to have democracy established in that country had made the normalization of Indo-Pak relations difficult. It is therefore, our opinion that Pakistan should return to complete democracy in the real sense, because failing to do this, would logically compel its neighbours especially India to consider whatever regime there, as illegitimate and dangerous.

With regards to the US, it is suggested that it should reconcile itself to the Indian policy of non-alignment as this policy is essentially peaceful, thus, helping, in the maintenance of peace and security; the US should stop giving disproportionate military aid to Pakistan more than its national defence requirements and should stop its war of proxy, because we tend to see the war between India and Pakistan in 1971 from the point that the US used Pakistan in the role of proxy in the region.

Turning to the Soviet Union, it is suggested that it should continue its peaceful policy in the region because once it is abandoned, the region might be engulfed in graver crisis that may spell doom for the world.

After the Liberation of Bangladesh, it was quite natural for Bangladesh people to feel grateful to India but they did not remain eternally thankful for Indian sympathy and help. India have consistently tried to maintain cordial relations with Bangladesh. India have been up and doing in avoiding anything which could hurt the susceptibilities of the people of Bangladesh. However, Maulana Bhashani's utterances regarding a United Bengal consisting of Bangladesh and West Bengal and other small states of northeast region is not a healthy signal for both the countries.

There are certain elements in Bangladesh who blamed India for anything that went against them in the internal politics of the country. India on her part had done well to keep itself away from the internal controversies and disputes. Just recently, Islam is being made the state religion in Bangladesh. In the bargain, India is witnessing today postures that are apparently anti-India. There are certain other irritants between the two countries for example, the Farakka Barrage question. India is therefore advised to take it cool and easy for it is all part of the game.

India should not be surprised as Bangladesh seems to have forgotten the past bitterness and even gone closer to Pakistan whose sole aim, would be to woo Bangladesh in every possible manner.

We therefore, suggest that under no circumstance should India try to show big brother attitude towards Bangladesh. Small nations are very sensitive in this respect. India should offer advice and help only when the government of Bangladesh asks for. The final decision on every other matter must be Bangladesh's. This should suit India well for Bangladesh can only be a strong partner to India in so far as it is independent. Similarly, Bangladesh having been economically exploited for a long time, India should not feel bad when Bangladesh is driving a hard bargain in trade

or commerce. To the maximum extent that India can, it should try to adjust their claims and give them all trade facilities which they consider necessary for their economic development.

APPENDIX-I

THE INDO-SOVIET TREATY OF PEACE, FRIENDSHIP AND CO-OPERATION
9 AUGUST 1971.

Desirous of expanding and consolidating the existing relations of sincere friendship between them, believing that the further development of friendship and co-operation meets the basic national interests of both the states as well as the interests of lasting peace in Asia and the world, determined to promote the consolidation of universal peace and security and to make steadfast efforts for the relaxation of international tensions and the final eliminations of the remnants of colonialism, reaffirming their firm belief in the principles of peaceful co-existence and co-operation between states with different political and social systems, convinced that in the world today international problems can only be solved by co-operation and not by conflict, reaffirming their determination to abide by the purposes and principles of the United Nations charter, the Republic of India on the one hand, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the other, have decided to conclude the present Treaty, for which purpose the following plenipotentiaries have been appointed:

On behalf of the Republic of India - the Minister of External Affairs of India, Swaran Singh.

On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - the Foreign Minister of the USSR, A.A. Gromyko,

Who, having each presented their credentials, which are found to be in proper form and due order, have agreed as follows:

(Article 1)

The High contracting parties solemnly declare that enduring peace and friendship shall prevail between the two countries and their peoples. Each party shall respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other and refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the other. The High contracting parties shall continue to develop and strengthen the relations of sincere friendship, good neighbourliness and all-round cooperation existing between them, on the basis of the above mentioned principles as well as the principles of equality and mutual benefit.

(Article II)

Guided by the desire to contribute in every possible way to ensure enduring peace and security of their people, the High contracting parties declare their determination to continue their efforts to preserve and strengthen peace in Asia and throughout the world, to halt the arms race and to achieve general and complete disarmament, including both nuclear and conventional, under effective international control.

(Article III)

Guided by their devotion to the lofty ideal of equality of all peoples and states, irrespective of race or creed, the High contracting parties condemn colonialism and racism in all forms and manifestations and reaffirm their determination to strive for their final and complete abolition.

The High contracting parties shall cooperate with other states in achieving these aims and to support the just aspirations of the peoples in their struggle against colonialism and racial domination.

(Article IV)

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republic respects India's policy of non-alignment and reaffirms that this policy is an important factor for maintaining universal peace and international security and for easing tension in the world.

The Republic of India respects the peaceful policy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics aimed at strengthening friendship and co-operation with all peoples.

(Article V)

Being deeply interested in ensuring universal peace and security, and attaching great importance to their mutual co-operation in the international field for achieving

these aims, the High contracting parties will maintain regular contacts with each other on major international problems affecting the interests of both the states by means of meetings, and exchanges of views between their leading statesmen, visits by official delegations and special envoys of the two Governments, and through diplomatic channels.

(Article VI)

Attaching great importance to economic, scientific and technological co-operation between them, the High contracting parties will continue to consolidate and expand mutually advantageous and comprehensive co-operation in these fields as well as expand trade, transport and communications between them on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit and most-favoured nation treatment, subject to the existing agreements and the special arrangements with contiguous countries as specified in the Indo-Soviet trade agreement of 26 December 1970.

(Article VII)

The High contracting parties shall promote further development of ties and contacts between them in the fields of science, art, literature, education, public health, press, radio, television, cinema, tourism and sports.

(Article VIII)

In accordance with the traditional friendship established between the two countries, each of the High contracting parties solemnly declares that it shall not enter into or participate in any military alliances directed against the other party.

Each of the High contracting parties undertakes to refrain from any aggression against the other party and not to allow the use of its territory for committing any act that may cause military damage to the other High contracting party.

(Article IX)

Each of the High contracting parties undertakes to refrain from giving any assistance to any third party taking part in an armed conflict with the other party. In the event that any of the parties is attacked or threatened with attack, the High contracting parties will immediately start mutual consultations with a view to eliminating this threat and taking appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security for their countries.

(Article X)

Each of the High contracting parties solemnly declares that it shall not undertake any commitment, secret or open, with regard to one or more states incompatible with the present Treaty. Each of the High contracting parties declares further that it has no commitments towards any other state

or states and shall not undertake any commitments that may cause military damage to the other party.

(Article XI)

The present Treaty is concluded for the duration of twenty years and will be automatically extended for each successive period of five years unless one of the High contracting parties declares its intention to terminate its operation by notifying the other High contracting party twelve months prior to the expiration of the Treaty. The Treaty will be subject to ratification and will come into force on the date of the exchange of Instruments of Ratification which will take place in Moscow within one month of the signing of this Treaty.

(Article XII)

Any differences in interpretation of any article or articles of the present treaty that may arise between the High contracting parties shall be settled on a bilateral basis by peaceful means in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding.

The above-mentioned plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty in Russian, Hindi and English, all the

texts being equally authentic, and affixed their seals thereto.

Done in New Delhi on 9 August 1971.

ON BEHALF OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

(Sd.) A.A. Gromyko,
Minister of External Affairs.

ON BEHALF OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA.

(Sd.) Swaran Singh,
Minister of External Affairs.

Source: Survival, XIII October 1971, pp.351-3.

APPENDIX-II

Memo on 3 December meeting

SECRET SENSITIVE

Assistant Secretary of Defence
Washington D.C. 20301

Refer to: 1-29643/71

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: WSAG Meeting on India/Pakistan

Participants:

Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs - Henry A. Kissinger

Under Secretary of State - John N. Irwin

Deputy Secretary of Defence - David Packard

Director, Central Intelligence Agency - Richard M. Helms

Deputy Administrator (A.I.D.) Maurice J. Williams

Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff - Admiral Thomas Moorer

Assistant Secretary of State (N.E.A.) - Joseph J. Sisco

Assistant Secretary of Defence (I.S.A.) - G. Warrent Nutter

Assistant Secretary of State (I.O.) - Samuel Depalma

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence (I.S.A.)
- Armistead I. Selden Jr.

Assistant Administrator (A.I.D./N.E.S.A.) - Donald G.
MacDonald

Time and Place: 3 December 1971, 1100 hours, situation room,
White House.

Summary

Reviewed conflicting reports about major actions in the West Wing. C.I.A. agreed to produce map showing areas of East Pakistan occupied by India. The President orders hold on issuance of additional irrevocable letters of credit involving \$ 99 million, and a hold on further action implementing the \$ 72 million P.L. 480 credit. Convening of Security Council meeting planned contingent on discussion with Pak Ambassador this afternoon plus further clarification of actual situation in West Pakistan. Kissinger asked for clarification of secret special interpretation of March 1959, bilateral U.S. agreement with Pakistan.

KISSINGER: I am getting hell every half hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India. He has just called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favour of Pakistan. He feels everything we do comes out otherwise.

HELMS: Concerning the reported action in the West Wing, there are conflicting reports from both sides and the only common ground is the Pak attacks on the Amritsar, Pathankot and Srinagar airports. The Paks say the Indians are attacking all along the border; but the Indian officials say this is a lie. In the East Wing, the action is becoming larger and the Paks claim there are now seven separate fronts involved.

KISSINGER: Are the Indians seizing territory?

HELMS: Yes, small bits of territory definitely.

SISCO: It would help if you could provide a map with a shading of the areas occupied by India. What is happening in the West - is a full-scale attack likely?

MOORER: The present pattern is puzzling in that the Paks have only struck at three small airfields which do not house significant number of Indian combat aircraft.

HELMS: Mrs. Gandhi's speech at 1:30 may well announce recognition of Bangladesh.

MOORER: The Pak attack is not credible. It has been made during the late afternoon, which doesn't make sense. We do not seem to have sufficient facts on this yet.

KISSINGER: Is it possible that the Indian attacked first, and the Paks simply did what they could before dark in response?

MOORER: This is certainly possible.

KISSINGER: The President wants no more irrevocable letters of credit issued under the \$ 99 million credit. He wants the \$ 72 million P.L. 480 credit also held.

WILLIAMS: Word will soon get around when we do this. Does the President understand that ?

KISSINGER: That is his order, but I will check with the President again. If asked, we can say we are reviewing our whole economic programme and that the granting of fresh aid

is being suspended in view of conditions on the sub-continent. The next issue is the UN.

IRWIN: The Secretary is calling in the Pak Ambassador this afternoon, and the Secretary leans towards making a US move in the UN soon.

KISSINGER: The President is in favour of this as soon as we have some confirmation of this large-scale new action. If the UN can't operate in this kind of situation effectively, its utility has come to an end and it is useless to think of UN guarantees in the Middle East.

SISCO: We will have a recommendation for you this afternoon, after the meeting with the Ambassador. In order to give the Ambassador time to wire home, we tentatively plan to convene the Security Council tomorrow.

KISSINGER: We hope to take action. The President is blaming me, but you people are in the clear.

SISCO: That's ideal!

KISSINGER: The earlier draft statement for Eush is too even-handed.

SISCO: To recapitulate, after we have seen the Pak Ambassador, the Secretary will report to you. We will update the draft speech for Bush.

KISSINGER: We can say we favour political accomodation but the real job of the Security Council is to prevent military action.

SISCO: We have never had a reply either from Kosygin or Mrs. Gandhi.

WILLIAMS: Are we to take economic steps with Pakistan also?

KISSINGER: Wait until I talk with the President. He hasn't addressed this problem in connection with Pakistan yet.

SISCO: If we act on the Indian side, we can say we are keeping the Pakistan situation 'under review'.

KISSINGER: It's hard to tilt toward Pakistan if we have to match every Indian step with a Pakistan step. If you wait until Monday, I can get a Presidential decision.

PACKARD: It should be easy for us to inform the banks involved to deferaction in as much as we are so near the weekend.

KISSINGER: We need a WSAG in the morning. We need to think about our treaty obligations. I remember a letter or memo interpreting our existing treaty with a special India tilt. When I visited Pakistan in January 1962, I was briefed on a secret document or oral understanding about contingencies arising in other than the SEATO context. Perhaps it was a Presidential letter. This was a special interpretation of the March 1959 bilateral agreement.

Prepared by:

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